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Call for Papers

Letter from the Department of Political Science
The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to
present Volume 3 of The Ramerican Political Science Review. This journal presents some of
the best undergraduate work produced by students during the 2017-2018 academic year.
Political science students ask normatively important questions impacting politics at
home and abroad, and the six papers featured in this volume are examples of the extensive
research and the systematic investigations conducted in order to begin answering those
questions.
This calendar year began with a Winter Olympics that saw North and South Korean
players skating together as one team; the historic event renewed interest in the prospect of
Korean Reunification across the globe. Hayne Noh explores this possibility and asks what the
economic consequences of such an outcome might be.
Katilyn Thomas and Thomas Fratkin take an international perspective in looking at
issues facing women in the twenty-first century. Thomas’ article investigates whether the
promotion of gender equality can decrease instances of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN
peacekeepers abroad, while Fratkins’ article continues a long lineage of scholarly research
that studies the potential impact that gender equality concerning access to education might
have on a country’s economic development.
We shift our attention back home, focusing on the seventeen-year War on Terror,
through the work of Saffeya Ahmed and Kevin Breiner. Ahmed’s article highlights biased
media framing of terrorist attacks based on the perpetrator’s identity, while Breiner’s
compels us to consider whether the increased scope of presidential authority when
conducting drone strikes has violated the U.S. Constitution.
And Maryum Elnasseh evaluates archived sources and contemporary data to better
contextualize accusations of intentional racial discrimination when Congress began waging
the War on Drugs.
The questions political science students ask encompass a range of sub-fields and use a
variety of theoretical approaches and political science methods. Ahmed’s article uses an
extensive longitudinal content analysis in order to test the hypothesis that media narratives
change depending on the identity of actors involved in terrorist schemes. Fratkin’s article
showcases the importance of quantitative methodology when conducting a regression
analysis of secondary data points, while Thomas’ article illustrates the pivotal nature of
qualitative methodology by adopting a case study approach.
We hope that these articles not only help to provide better understanding of relevant
questions concerning the state of our politics, domestically and abroad, but also that they
help inspire new questions for our readers. Furthermore, we hope that the work of this
volume’s researchers will encourage other students to conduct their own political science
research, and to submit it for consideration to The Ramerican Political Science Review next
year, whether exploring American politics, international relations, comparative politics, public
policy or political theory.
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While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science and the
contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that
solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. The researchers featured in this
issue went through a “revise and resubmit” process, wherein they made content and style
changes that were requested by the editorial staff. The articles were then edited once more
by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a testament to their immense
efforts during the summer months. The Department of Political Science would, therefore,
like to thank this year’s editorial board:
Madeline Doane, Class of 2020
Thomas Kipp, Class of 2019
Sneha Krish, Class of 2019
The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf
for advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing
submissions and formatting this journal.
VCU Department of Political Science
August 2018
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TO WHAT EXTENT WILL PEACEFUL KOREAN REUNIFICATION IMPACT
BOTH THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIES?
Hayne Noh, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
After nearly 65 years, officials from both North and South Korea have vowed
to end the Korean War. Although the Korean War is yet to be officially over,
this historic event raises the critical question of whether Korean
reunification is imminent and, if so, what economic results will come from
reunification. The topic of Korean reunification, and the implications of such
an event, however, have largely been evaluated through the lens of case
studies and are therefore limited in the quantitative predictions surrounding
reunification. The present study addresses this literature gap by
investigating the predicted effects of peaceful reunification on the North and
South Korean economies using a forecasting model in SPSS to predict GDP
growth (%) following reunification. Results of the study suggest that South
Korea will likely bear a heavy monetary burden following Korean
reunification, while North Korea will benefit from the influx of welfare
among other financial advantages. Future studies may consider a
multidisciplinary approach to the topic of Korean reunification by accounting
for other major factors, in addition to economics, such as political or cultural
implications of reunification.
Introduction
Breaking news surrounding North and South Korean relations has
dominated the media in recent months. At the start of 2018, during the
Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held in South Korea, North Korea announced
it would send athletes to the games in an amicable move that loosened years
of diplomatic tensions. Not only did North Korea send athletes to the games,
but North and South Korea formed a joint women’s hockey team. Athletes
from both Koreas walked in the Olympic ceremony under a unified, One
Korea flag. Events following the Winter Olympics in South Korea suggested
a swift positive change in relations between the two Koreas. North and South
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Korea are closer to reunification than ever before and because of the
increasing potential to reunify, it is imperative to address the question: To
what extent will peaceful Korean reunification impact both the North and
South Korean economies?
North and South Korea were formed following the ceasefire
armistice agreement in 1953 after years of back and forth military combat.
To this date, an official peace treaty has still never been signed, but an
agreement has been made to work towards an official end to the Korean
War (Chan, 2018). As evidenced by the lack of the signing an official peace
treaty after the war, not many believed the division between the Koreas
would last as long as it has. In the decades following their division, relations
between North and South Korea have fluctuated, falling anywhere within the
spectrum of neutral to aggressive.
In the weeks following the Olympics, Kim Jong Un announced a
desire to meet with both South Korea’s and the United States’ presidents in
order to discuss diplomatic relations and denuclearization in North Korea,
paving the way for a new era of diplomacy between both the Koreas and the
United States. Despite the uncertainty of such a diplomatic summit, Kim Jong
Un attended a South Korean K‐pop concert held in North Korea, much to the
surprise of South Korea and the rest of the world. Furthermore, in the days
following the concert, Kim Jong Un began meeting with high‐level South
Korean officials and finally met with South Korean President, Moon Jae‐in, in
a summit on April 27th, 2018. Most shocking, was the announcement that
North and South Korea intend to sign an agreement calling for the official
end to the Korean War, a historic step forward in Korean relations (Sang‐hun
& Perlez, 2018). At the summit, Kim himself suggested the possibility of
reunification: “Using one language, one culture, one history, North and
7
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South Korea will be joined as one nation,” paving the way for a new
relationship between the two Koreas (Chan, 2018). Such active diplomatic
movement has made it clear that North Korea’s ambitious rhetoric has
moved beyond mere contemplation. North Korea took steps to meet with
U.S. President, Donald Trump. North Korean officials first met with then CIA
director Mike Pompeo in a classified meeting in April 2018 in order to initiate
talks with the United States.
Reunification in Korea would mean the complete integration of
North and South Korea in terms of political, cultural and economic factors.
In terms of political factors, this integration would require the unification of
North Korea’s autocratic and South Korea’s democratic government into one
central government. The unification of North and South Korea’s distinctive
cultures would be necessary for complete reunification. Economically, the
two distinct market models of North and South Korea would need to fall
under one integrated market model, combining the flow of GDP, human
capital, and resources into one state. North Korea is marked by closed trade,
a small economy, and a comparatively poor economy. South Korea, on the
other hand, is characterized by fairly open trade policies, a much larger
economy, and a stable GDP over the past decade. Although political and
cultural factors are indeed important in deciding whether reunification will
be feasible, economic determinants may have ripple effects beyond the
Korean economy.
This paper will analyze current literature surrounding the
ramifications of Korean reunification, specifically focusing on monetary or
GDP considerations. The theoretical framework for the research question:
“To what extent will peaceful Korean reunification impact both the North
and South Korean economy?” will be discussed following the literature
8
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review. After the theoretical framework, which argues that South Korea will bear
the burden of reunification, the methodology used will be outlined, including
a justification for the analytic technique and forecasting model utilized in the
body of the paper. Finally, the explanation of results and findings will
comprise of an evaluation of the study’s limitations and potential
directions for future studies.
Literature Review

While integration implies the need for a cost‐benefit analysis before finalizing
reunification agreements, of interest is the likelihood of
reunification in the first place. Scholars, such as Bruce
W. Bennett in a report titled, “Preparing for the Possibility of a
North Korean Collapse”, asserted it is rational to expect the collapse of
North Korea’s government in the near future by using the limited poverty and
famine data available from the enigmatic country to support their assertion
(2013). As one of the last socialist systems of the Soviet era, or “Soviet‐like”
economies still standing,
North Korea’s economic collapse becomes more likely as time passes, just as
other Soviet era economies, like the USSR and China, have fallen one by one
(Barna, 1998). Although the possibility of military force to achieve
reunification is indeed possible, North Korea’s susceptibility to famine and
overall economic instability serve as evidence for a growing body of experts
who believe it is North Korea’s collapse or deterioration in
the foreseeable uture that would make Korean reunification more likely to occur
(Bennett, 2013; Harvey, Kiessling, & Moeller, 2013; Noland, 2007) .Vast
differences exist between North and South Korea as North Korea has built
its market infrastructure on self‐sufficiency, while South
Korea has developed its model on global development and international
trade (Noland, 2007). In the years following its policy reform, South Korea
9
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saw an age of impressive GDP growth, while North Korea experienced famine
and the accumulation of debt to its socialist supporters like the Soviet Union
and China (Noland, 2007). Moreover, several major world players have major
interest in the situation unfolding in Korea, including the United States,
China, and Russia, due to trade agreements and business partnerships,
suggesting these countries will have an influence in any agreements and
development opportunities that may come as a result of Korean
reunification (Tkachenko, 2015).
Much of the literature surrounding the topic of Korean integration
has used German reunification as a case study, as several parallels have been
drawn between the unification of East and West Germany in 1990 to the
potential impact of an integration in North and South Korea. Just as the
unification of West and East Germany led to West Germany’s wealthier and
more globalized economy carrying the burden of East Germany’s economy,
South Korea will likely be required to do the same for North Korea (Blum,
2001; Estrada, Park, Ndoma, & Kim, 2015; Song, 2003). Since the gap
between North and South Korea’s economy and development is so
extensive, the cost of reunification in Korea is estimated to exceed the cost
of Germany’s 2 trillion‐euro reunification by close to double that amount
(Mun & Yoo, 2012). The towering fiscal burden would likely fall on South
Korea or otherwise require aid and investments from foreign nations (Choi,
Merrill, Yang, & Chang, 2001.).
Similarly to German reunification, Korea’s reunification will be
heavily influenced by the United States, Russia, and China. Russia in
particular, following the 2014 Ukrainian conflict with the United States, has
turned its attention to maintaining the “status quo” in the Korean peninsula
by discouraging attempts at reunification and fueling the Kim autocracy
10
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(Tkachenko, 2015). In fact, it has been suggested that the topic of Korean
reunification is reminiscent of the power struggle that existed between the
United States and the former Soviet Union over East and West Germany
(Tkachenko, 2015). China, which is presumed to have the greatest political
influence over North Korea due to its proximity, also has a vested interest in
the potential reunification of the Koreas (Garrett & Glaser, 1995). Not only
is China North Korea’s biggest trade partner, it is also interested in protecting
its borders and its “communist” partner (Garrett & Glaser, 1995). The United
States, on the other hand, is one of South Korea’s greatest allies and would
need to contend with China if a power struggle over Korea were to arise
(Tkachenko, 2015). As such, Korean reunification is not limited to domestic
matters, but international interests as well.
Although many factors affect the willingness of the Koreas to reunify,
the uncertainty over the costs and benefits of reunification serves as a
significant barrier. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) to model
the integration between the Koreas, Noland et al. suggested in a study titled,
“Modeling Korean unification”, that product market integration would
largely reduce famine costs in North Korea, while having an insignificant
impact on South Korea in terms of potential monetary gains (2000).
However, recent investigations contradicting the notion that reunification
will be inconsequential to South Korea, have been suggested. For example,
Cheong asserted that integration may lead to benefits for the South Korean
economy through the increase in the availability of North Korea’s natural
resources, such as North Korea’s largely untouched mineral wealth (2015).
To further complicate the potential situation that will unfold in the event of
Korean reunification, studies have found that South Korea would likely be
burdened, or negatively impacted, by the responsibility of developing North
11
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Korea, suggesting that reunification would only be possible on South Korea’s
own terms (Song, 2003; Mun & Yoo, 2012).
Theoretical Argument
The present theory framing the logical argument behind this study
will assert first that Korean reunification is not only possible, but will likely,
considering current circumstances, occur through peaceful means.
Accounting for current events, past literature results, and historical
applications, reunification is a possibility in Korea’s future. With this
possibility in mind, the need to consider the implications of Korean
reunification will be of particular utility to North and South Korea as they
evaluate the potential outcomes of reunification on their respective
economies. The second section of the theoretical framework will discuss the
benefits and costs for North and South Korea independently, in order to
hypothesize the impacts of Korean reunification.
Key Reunification Concepts
Reunification is the full political, cultural, and economic integration
between two formerly distinct states into one internationally recognized
entity. Korean reunification implies that Korea would be fully economically
integrated, politically under one national government, and function as a
single country or state to the extent that was present before the Korean
division at the 38th parallel. The ideal standards of reunification would occur
through peaceful means, either through negotiation or treaty, and without
the use of military force to damage or deter the other side, as this method
of reunification would accrue the lowest additional cost. Not only would a
peaceful form of reunification be less costly compared to waging war, but it
is the route of integration suggested by North Korea’s recent amicable
12
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behavior compared to its historically hostile nature. The immediate impact
on the economy will be determined by the amount of predicted GDP growth,
stagnation, or decrease, using South Korea’s current GDP numbers as the
baseline figures projected to 2030. This will be done in order to accurately
assess the immediate impact following disruption of both the North and
South Korean economies, if reunification were to occur in 2018. Due to
North Korea’s secrecy and the difficulty in obtaining accurately reported
datas, improvements made in GDP growth will be compared to South
Korea’s current status.
The Possibility of Korean Reunification
Because Korean reunification entails the integration of political,
cultural, and economic factors, reunification could occur under favorable
political, cultural, and economic conditions. When North and South Korea
were partitioned in 1945, the intention was to one day be reunified, as only
a ceasefire agreement was signed. While the desire to be reunified has
prevailed since the division, obstacles to reunification often came in the form
of North Korea’s hostility and a lack of continuous communication between
the two sides. In addition, a lack of urgency has prevented major strides
towards Korean reunification. However, current events point to both an
increasing urgency to reunify, a decrease in North Korea’s hostility, and
increased communication not only with North and South Korea, but also
major foreign players such as the United States.
Politically speaking, North Korea’s autocratic ruler, Kim Jong Un, has
made recent attempts to establish intentional diplomacy with South Korea
and the United States, by extending open invitations to continue meeting
with each nation’s leader within the next year. In fact, Kim Jong Un stated in
his own words that he wanted to “write a new history of national
13
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reunification”, suggesting the two Koreas are entering a new era with
respect to diplomatic relations (Berlinger, 2018). Not only will a direct phone
line between North and South Korean officials be established within April of
2018, but news reports suggest that the two Koreas will announce a peace
treaty officially ending the Korean War in the months following a summit
that was held in April, 2018 (Lee, 2018). Although an official peace treaty
ending the war has yet to be signed, North and South Korean leaders are
currently discussing their intentions to pursue permanent peace on the
Korean Peninsula.
Although North Korea has strict control over media and the
information flow into the country, some forms of foreign media have
penetrated the closed‐off country. This influx of information suggests that
as time moves forward, North Korean propaganda techniques and
government media may have a weaker influence on their North Korean
civilian audience. South Korea’s political arena has recently experienced a
bout of political corruption, which consequently led to public disinterest. For
example, South Korea’s former president, Park Geun‐hye, was ousted for
due to abuse of power, corruption, and bribery. Since there has been a
longstanding interest in reunification since the war, South Korean politicians
have now set their gaze on reunification as a method to win public favor, as
is the case with South Korea’s current President, Moon Jae‐in. President
Moon’s personal connection to Korean reunification is evident in his own
upbringing, in addition to his stance on reunification. Moon himself was
separated from relatives as his parents were North Korean refugees who fled
to the South because of the Korean war (Rogin, 2017). Moon’s story
resonates strongly with millions of Koreans who were separated before,
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during, and after the war, and who still hold strongly to possibility of seeing
their family once again.
A significant portion of the literature reviewed suggests that North
and South Korean reunification is not only possible, but also imminent
(Barna, 1998; Bennett, 2013; Harvey, Kiessling, & Moeller, 2013; Noland,
2007). However, scholars have also offered an opposing view to Korean
reunification, suggesting that North Korea will remain in its current state
until dramatic military force or provocation leads North Korea to be
overtaken by their allies. Questions linger as to why North Korean leader,
Kim Jong Un, has suddenly attempted to form diplomatic ties with the U.S.
and South Korea. It is shocking, both economically and politically, that North
Korea has sustained itself for as long as it has (Koh, 2012). Almost no other
Soviet‐like regime still stands today, with the exception of North Korea’s
unexpected endurance (Barna, 1998). The two major Soviet era
powerhouses, the former USSR and China, which are also the two states that
should have had enough prowess in order to sustain themselves, have
drastically altered their market models to adapt to the ever‐globalizing
marketplace, while North Korea’s isolationist model has remained stagnant
for decades. Secondly, North Korea’s prolonged sustainment has come not
without a price. Famine stricken areas in North Korea have become
commonplace and support from Russia and China, North Korea’s two closest
allies, has become scarce (Magid, 2000). The role of foreign aid in North
Korea has, in part, contributed to its prolonged sustainment, but Russia and
China’s oversight in North Korea has decreased rapidly in recent years. In
addition, the trend of increased globalization continues to move forward
with little sign of slowing down. This movement suggests that countries with
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isolationist policies, who lack knowledge and information, may be left
behind in terms of technological advancements.
The likelihood of a North Korean regime collapse, paired with the
country’s poor financial situation, makes the conditions for peaceful
reunification optimal. The total cost of reunification will differ based on the
events leading to reunification itself. Potential outcomes include full‐scale
war between North and South Korea, military takeover by one side, or
peaceful reunification in which neither side uses military force in order to
negotiate terms of reunification. Under current circumstances, North Korea
is unable to fund a sustained war against South Korea, particularly in the
wake of scarce foreign aid. North Korea’s GDP falls at around $40 billion GDP
(power purchasing parity) and ranks at 118 in the world (“The World
Factbook”), far from South Korea and its closest ally, the United States,
which both consistently appear in the top 15 economies in the world. South
Korea would not be the first to provoke military conflict because of their
legitimacy, in the same vein as to why the United States would not instigate
a nuclear attack in North Korea unless first provoked by the other side.
Scholars have suggested that peaceful reunification will be the most likely
outcome, particularly in the event of North Korea’s collapse and South
Korea’s assumption of responsibility or an extended negotiation process
without the use of coercive military force on either side (Garrett & Glaser,
1995). A lack of clarity exists on the mechanism through which peaceful
reunification will occur. Whether reunification will occur through North
Korean collapse or diplomacy and negotiation between the two sides is
unknown. However, it is clear that, ultimately, neither side’s first choice
would be war.

16
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The evidence points to the likelihood of reunification in Korea’s
future, with North Korea’s collapse a plausible and reasonable outcome. It is
imperative to consider the potential economic implications of Korean
reunification and whether these impacts could incentivize or deter
reunification from occurring. From a rationalist perspective, positive gains
from reunification will incentivize the Koreas to reunify, while clear losses
with little benefit from reunification may offset the course to reunify.
Although economic factors alone cannot fully explain the intent to reunify,
and political and cultural variables will certainly play a role, economic factors
will undoubtedly be discussed during any reunification agreement or
negotiation.
Economic Costs and Benefits of Reunification
The major barrier to a reunified Korea is cost. Reunification is an
expensive endeavor that requires significant financial capital and
investment. For example, in the case of German reunification, the total cost
was around 2 trillion euros (Mun & Yoo, 2012), and the burden to pay these
costs was largely placed on West Germany. West Germany, much like South
Korea, was far more developed than its counterpart, which directed the vast
majority of financial cost on the state that had the means to pay for
reunification. Predictions regarding Korean unification have suggested the
Korean reunification cost will likely exceed Germany’s cost by nearly twice
the amount , even after the cost was adjusted for inflation, because the
difference between North and South Korea is significantly greater than that
of East and West Germany (Mun & Yoo, 2012). More recent analyses
conducted by researchers assert that the cost will likely be close to $3 Trillion
dollars USD (Revesz, 2017). Even with such wide ranges of estimates, it is
clear that Korean reunification will be costly. Part of the cost of reunification
17
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comes from the cost of building new infrastructure, such as highways,
buildings, and transit systems connecting the two formerly separated
countries. The raw materials, human capital, and oversight into these
endeavors will be expensive. Another cost will stem from the provision of
aid and welfare to North Korea’s undernourished and impoverished
population. In addition, there will be the added cost of integrating the
formerly separated government structures. With no clear reunification plan
presently in place, the cost of combining or equitably partitioning
government roles and positions will also need to be considered.
The primary issue that will need to be confronted in the event of
reunification is that North Korea does not have substantial financial capital,
while South Korea has the means to carry a significant burden. There exists
an undeniably large disparity between North and South Korea’s markets, not
only in terms of the market system used in each country, but also in terms
of the development categorization and status. Countries may fall into one of
three, mutually exclusive, categories: underdeveloped, quickly developing,
or developed (Vokina et al., 2016). Under this classification system, the
North Korean economy is considered underdeveloped, while South Korea,
as the world’s 11th largest economy in terms of nominal GDP (“Rankings”),
is considered economically developed. Furthermore, the World Bank
categorizes North Korea as low income while categorizing South Korea as
high income (“Databank”). The two Koreas are not simply different, but fall
on complete opposite sides of the development and wealth spectrums. The
longitudinal GDP of North Korea is largely unknown, as the country does not
regularly release information regarding their economy, and when data is
released, the data’s validity is often called into question. On the other hand,
the GDP of South Korea, which, in 2015, totaled over one trillion USD
18
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(“Databank”), has been fairly stable since the 1990s. This stability is
extremely important, as it may offset an unsteady transition during the
reunification process. Since North Korea simply does not have sufficient
funds to sustain reunification, South Korea will have to pay for the bulk of
reunification costs.
Benefits and Costs for South Korea
South Korean officials would need to account for the benefits and
costs of reunification if, and when it happens, by creating a reunification plan
to ensure the best possible outcome for both North and South Korea.
Benefits of proposed reunification, for South Korea in particular, are
potential GDP growth, access to natural resources and undeveloped land,
and an influx of human capital from North Korea. South Korea’s GDP growth
has been stagnant for years now and such a drastic change may revive
economic stagnation in South Korea. Reunification will also give South Korea
access to North Korea’s natural resources. The availability of raw material
will be one of North Korea’s largest contributions to Korean reunification.
Excess land will also provide more areas for development, as overcrowding
is a familiar problem to South Korea. In addition, the combination of the
working population will benefit both Koreas, as there are more people
available to build the infrastructure and government institutions required
for reunification.
South Korea will have to lead the charge to properly integrate the
two Koreas because North Korea, under the presumed circumstances, does
not have the means to do so. Therefore, South Korea will pay for the
development of infrastructure and programs that target mass welfare and
aid to North Korean civilians. The human capital required to mend two
formerly separate nations will also incur a cost on South Korea. Whether
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these benefits outweigh the projected costs, while excluding extraneous
variables such as cultural costs and benefits, is of particular interest when
determining whether South Korea will favor reunification.
Benefits and Costs for North Korea
Several benefits for North Korea exist in the event of reunification.
One such benefit is that the area formerly known as North Korea, when
integrated, may assume a “developed” or, at minimum, a “developing”
status, which could attract foreign investment to the previously isolated
area. Underdeveloped nations often are less attractive to investors, so the
affiliation with South Korea’s advanced market model may serve as a key
benefit to North Korea in terms of growing its economy compared to years
previously (Vokina et al., 2016). Secondly, the transfer of technology and
globalization that will influx into the former North Korea in a manner unseen
in the country since its conception, may have a positive impact on the overall
integrated Korean economy. As a result of globalization, another benefit
would be free access to this technology that will help advance the
development of North Korea. Finally, as South Korea would likely move to
develop land in North Korea and urbanize the area much like itself, it would
first need to address the issue of famine and poverty before it is able to
assume the land for new business endeavors.
In these circumstances, North Korea would have to make significant
sacrifices in terms of political oversight into the economy, especially in an
increasingly globalized economy. South Korea historically certainly has the
upper hand in successfully developing an economy. However, the monetary
costs of Korean reunification on North Korea is undetermined. The sacrifice
will stem from the question of whether formerly North Korean businesses
will be able to compete with South Korean businesses on the global stage. If
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these businesses are unable to transition from an isolationist to a globalized
model, they will likely be unable to compete with South Korean companies
and the influx of foreign corporations. However, direct economic difficulties
for North Korea will largely rest on the reunification plan itself, which has yet
to be conceived. Lack of evidence prevents the extrapolation of North
Korea’s costs without a set reunification plan, and therefore, unlike South
Korea’s costs, the expense cannot be predicted. Such a subject is more
appropriately addressed in a discussion of the long‐term, rather than
immediate, impacts of Korean reunification.
Hypothesis
Under the presumed peaceful reunification circumstances, evidence
that suggests the benefits following reunification would outweigh the costs
for South Korea is lacking, although the benefits of reunification for North
Korea’s economic status are relatively abundant. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that, due to the strength and stability of the South Korean
economy, North Korea’s economy will significantly benefit at the expense of
South Korea’s economy immediately after reunification.
Research Design
Data Collection
Data were gathered from the World Bank Organization (WBO), the
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The datasets used were
gathered from globally available sources for their accuracy and reliability as
widely recognized international entities. GDP growth (%) for South Korea
and working population size data for both North and South Korea was
gathered from the WBO. GDP data for North Korea was gathered from the
CIA. Finally, data regarding natural resource use for South Korea was drawn
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from the OECD data set. Due to the lack of data available from North Korea
regarding market growth, South Korea’s baseline data for GDP growth (%)
was used. No primary data was collected by the researcher.
Variables of Interest
The outcome variable in this study was GDP (%) growth of the
reunified Korea. Baseline longitudinal data for South Korea’s GDP growth (%)
from the WBO (2017) beginning in 1961 until 2016 was used to predict the
outcome variable. South Korea’s longitudinal GDP growth (%) was used as
baseline data points in order to determine the extent to which reunification
would alter the GDP growth (%) of South Korea, assuming reunification
occurs within the year 2018.
Several predictor variables were used in order to account for factors
that may impact GDP growth of Korea following reunification. Among a
multitude of factors, the size of the country’s population or human capital,
the availability of natural resources owned and used by the state, and the
current GDP growth (%) were used as predictors for future GDP growth (%).
The study considered North and South Korea’s current working population,
aged 15‐65 (WBO, 2017), as well as South Korea’s Total Domestic Extraction
Used (OECD, 2018), as a measure of the natural resources available and used
in South Korea over 5‐year increments. To the best of the knowledge of the
researcher, all the available information on North and South Korea’s market
data came from reliable resources, which were sought and used in order to
the address the research question.
Statistical Analyses
Data were projected until the year 2030, in order to assess the
immediate effects of reunification following the anticipated immediate
shock to the Korean economy. In order to predict potential GDP growth (%)
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to 2030, and address the research question of the study, data was analyzed
in the statistical software, SPSS 24, using the Brown’s forecasting model. The
forecasting model accounted for the predictor variables of working
population size in North and South Korea and natural resource use in South
Korea and allowed the extrapolation of baseline data to project the Korean
GDP growth in years following reunification. A null model was created in
order to assess the results of Korean reunification without accounting for the
predicted cost of reunification. The null model would suggest a “best” case
scenario for South Korea after reunification. In other words, the model
would outline the GDP growth of a reunified Korea compared to the baseline
South Korean GDP growth if there was little to no cost of reunification. From
this analysis, it will be feasible to extrapolate whether peaceful reunification
would be beneficial or detrimental to South Korea’ current GDP status.
Results and Discussion
Results
Table 1. depicts the projected GDP growth (%) of a reunified Korea
from 2017 to 2030. Model 1 was conceived using the Brown Forecasting
Model, with the known data points from South Korea’s GDP growth (%)
beginning in 1961 until 2016. The R‐squared value of the model was 0.787,
suggesting an adequate mode of fit for Model 1.
The overall GDP growth (%) trend, as depicted in Figure 1., suggests
that the GDP growth (%) of a reunified Korea would visibly decrease
compared to the baseline GDP growth (%) of South Korea from 1961‐2016.
The final GDP growth (%) in 2030 was predicted to be 0.29%, whereas South
Korea’s current GDP growth (%) is around 2.80%. The forecasting model
suggests that a reunified Korea, compared to South Korea in modern day,
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would experience a 2.51% decrease in GDP growth over the 14‐year span
after reunification.
Although a GDP growth decrease of 2.51% may seem small, or
tolerable for an established economy, South Korea’s GDP growth (%) has
been relatively stable throughout the 2000s, fluctuating only once as a result
of the 2008 world financial crisis. This stability is a sign of a robust, developed
economy. Well developed countries tend to show stable annual growth
between years unless there is a global fiscal crisis or unexpected domestic
event. The reunification of North and South Korea may lead to a negative
effect on the overall Korean economy compared to years when the economy
of the two countries were independent. Even in decades after the event of
reunification, South Korea’s GDP growth (%) is projected to steadily
decrease.
Discussion
Given the analysis, South Korea’s GDP growth (%) is projected to
significantly decrease in the years following Korean reunification.
Considering the cost of reunification as well as the benefits to both North
and South Korea, it is clear that South Korea will benefit less than North
Korea economically. Therefore, assuming South Korea will act rationally,
South Korea will not agree to reunification terms for economic reasons
because the costs of reunification would far outweigh the benefits.
Model 1 of the analyses was a prediction of the “best” case scenario
for South Korea. Even in a null model, in which South Korea would not
personally bear any of the costs of reunification, it is clear that the
reunification event itself would potentially decrease the GDP growth (%).
Since it is more realistic that South Korea would bear the majority of the
financial cost of the reunification, reunification may lead to a steeper
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decrease than predicted in the model. Although benefits, such as the
increase in total working population and the influx of natural resources may
help buffer the negative impacts, the results suggest the GDP growth will
likely experience long term decrease before these benefits may take place.
Thus, South Korea would be dissuaded from pursuing reunification purely
for economic means as it would have to bear the cost of reunification while
North Korea would reap many benefits.
This finding, however, is not an assertion that South Korea will never
agree to reunification because of the refusal to carry a monetary burden for
the sake of a reunification agreement. In addition to certain economic
factors, there may be political or cultural considerations not discussed within
the scope of this study that may outweigh economic cost and incentivize
South Korea to reunify with North Korea. For example, in the event of a
North Korean government collapse or overthrow of the dominant party,
South Korea may see a cultural responsibility to intercede. Likewise, in the
event of North Korean regime collapse or a peaceful reunification
agreement, it is also possible that Korean political leaders may seek an
opportunistic movement to reunify in order to gain public support for
themselves and eliminate some of the public distrust of the government,
particularly in an era where government corruption and public
disillusionment is high. Reuniting families, a moral sense of responsibility, or
political victories are among the many political and cultural reasons why
South Korea may still opt for reunification in spite of the fiscal burden.
Therefore, although South Korea may be dissuaded from pursuing
reunification with North Korea, there may be cultural or political factors,
beyond the scope of this study, that may incentivize reunification
independent of potential economic losses or gains for either country.
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Conclusion
The findings of the study indicate that in the event of reunification,
South Korea’s economy would be negatively affected. More specifically,
while North Korea would benefit from welfare and aid flooding into the
country, and while South Korea would benefit through the influx of raw
materials and population growth, South Korea’s GDP growth is predicted to
decrease significantly following reunification. Therefore, the hypothesis
that North Korea would benefit from reunification at the cost of South
Korea was supported. Following this logic, South Korea should not pursue
reunification as this will have a negative impact on their economy. South
Korea may, however, consider other potential benefits, beyond economic
gains, in order to address whether or not to pursue reunification
negotiations with North Korea. This study outlined the predicted
quantitative GDP trend impacts on both North and South Korea following
the event of reunification. The predictions discussed may aid North and
South Korean officials by clarifying the certainty of the future of North and
South Korean diplomatic relations.
Limitations
The current study was not without limitations. Firstly, economic
matters were assessed, but political and cultural matters were largely not
considered. Political and cultural factors are two important factors beyond
the scope of this study, but are still valuable to address in a holistic
evaluation of the probability and implications of reunification. Secondly,
limited data from North Korea prevented a longitudinal assessment of
North Korea’s growth. The accuracy of the available data coming from
North Korea is questionable because of the inability to verify data from
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North Korean sources. Therefore, a null model using South Korean data
was utilized instead, which may have left out some key variables
contributing to Korea reunification.
A major assumption of the study was that the two Koreas would
unify by peaceful means. Although evidence supports this theory, there
remains some uncertainty regarding reunification by peaceful means.
Unforeseen circumstances, such as accidental or unintentional provocation
of either side could certainly alter this assumption. In addition to the
assumption that the Koreas would reunify via peaceful means was also the
belief that this reunification would likely happen through North Korean
collapse.
However, logically speaking, there exists an inherent impossibility
to predict without a reasonable doubt that the collapse of North Korea is
imminent. Using past literature and abstracting from current events, it is
possible to suggest the likelihood or probability of a reunification outcome,
but there exists a margin of error that must be acknowledged. There are
other potential avenues, not addressed within this study, through which
reunification could occur, if at all. Although there is utility in predicting
potential outcomes of reunification, a true evaluation of the implications of
such an event can only occur after the alliance between the countries itself
becomes a reality.
Future Studies
Future studies regarding Korean reunification may investigate how
the results from this study potentially have reverberations on a global
scale. An in‐depth analysis on the role of the United States, China, and
Russia, major countries that may influence the process of reunification,
may be useful in determining the political reasons behind why the Koreas
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may or may not unify. Studies may also address the cultural implications of
reunification, in terms of the language, norms, and value differences that
now exist between the two Koreas, and how such cultural differences will
need to be addressed in order to fully integrate two formerly separate, and
drastically different, nations. Additional studies may consider the political
changes that would need to take place in order to smoothly transition two
government types into one. Further studies may also examine this topic
from an interdisciplinary standpoint to investigate, simultaneously, the
political, cultural, and economic impact of reunification on Korea, building
upon the analysis completed within this paper.
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THE IMPACT OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
AND ABUSE BY UN PEACEKEEPERS
Katilyn Thomas, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of host communities by UN
peacekeepers is a type of post‐war violence that has been growing over the
years. SEA is an important issue in many peacekeeping missions and it has
defined UN peacekeeping for a while. Thus, this article considers whether
gender mainstreaming, the approach of promoting gender equality to
troops, can decrease the amount of SEA. This research will use a most similar
systems design case study to analyze the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS).
Drawing on data of SEA accusations between 2007 and 2015, as well as
analyzing gender training implementation, female high‐ranking positions,
and gender divisions available within these two cases, this research
examines SEA through the lens of gender mainstreaming. Particularly, this
article indicates that SEA lessens when gender mainstreaming is
implemented and enforced and discusses how a peacekeeping mission,
which brings its own ideals and socializing practices, may promote the
development and duration of SEA.
Introduction
The United Nations has deployed over 65 peacekeeping operations
around the world since 1948 (The UN 2016). In the initial years,
peacekeeping missions were mainly deployed to help solidify peace
agreements and utilize political resources to settle warfare in a peaceful
way. Yet, the limelight has now turned towards the unexpected side effects
of peacekeeping (Nordas and Rustad 2012). The earliest reported case of
sexual exploitation and abuse enacted by UN peacekeepers was throughout
the United Nations Mission in Liberia mission in Cambodia in 1992
(Whitworth, 2004). Statements started to emerge that UN peacekeepers had
taken part in sexual violence and the rise of prostitution (Whitworth, 2004).
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Local residents also started to complain about the growth of sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs) as UN peacekeepers vacationed in Thailand and
came back with HIV and other infections, which circulated across the local
communities (Martin, 2005). The UN hospital administered to roughly 5000
occurrences of STDs within the mission (Martin, 2005). In Kosovo, East
Timor, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia, the emergence of
UN peacekeepers coexisted with the emergence of sex trafficking and
brothels almost immediately. In each of these missions, it is UN
peacekeepers that participated in trafficking and establishing brothels from
which UN Peacekeepers made a profit (Allred, 2006; Vandenberg, 2005;
Koyama & Myrtinnen, 2007).
At the start of the twenty‐first century, the UN began to
acknowledge the issue of SEA. In 1995, the UN started developing a protocol
response to the increasing issue of sexual exploitation and abuse. The UN
created various divisions pertaining to women, peace, and security, which
started to alter the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In 2001, the
United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the approach of gender
mainstreaming, which advocates for gender equality and the inserting of
women, as well as men, in all realms of peacekeeping operations (UN
gender, 2016). In 2003, the United Nations enforced a pledge to a zero
tolerance policy for SEA written by the Secretary‐General (Kanetake, 2010).
The Secretary‐General assured that all peacekeepers found responsible of
SEA would be dismissed and penalized promptly. This pledge came after
social shock that many UN peacekeepers that had been found responsible of
sexual misconduct were frequently given a small reprimand and then
brought back to active duty in the peacekeeping mission (Kanetake, 2010).
Even then, it was not until 2005 that the Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations installed the Conduct and Discipline Team, and began to instruct
the peacekeepers to conform to the new protocol (Karim and Beardsley,
2016).
This research will focus on assessing how the approach of gender
mainstreaming has functioned in preventing SEA. The theoretical argument
of this analysis implies a history of the subjugation of women through the
liberal feminist theory and indicates that a particular group culture emerges
within peacekeeping forces. This group culture may contribute to a kind of
militarized masculinity, which could establish acceptance for sexual abuse
(Martin, 2005). In this paper, it will be argued that gender mainstreaming
will help build awareness and insight among the peacekeepers, which would
potentially shift the masculine culture and lessen SEA. The research will be
conducted by analyzing how UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
and Sudan/South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS) have implemented gender
mainstreaming and have experienced variations in the levels of SEA in each
mission.
Literature Review
It is often argued that sexual exploitation and the abuse of women
in wartime go hand in hand. In ‘Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape,’
Brownmiller, a feminist author, clarifies, in line with the Feminist Theory,
that actions of sexual violence are impressions of male dominance and the
patriarchal rationale that women are the natural possession of men (1975).
During war, women can be seen as sexual commodities for enemy soldiers,
which relates to the perception of women in traditional cultures as being
men’s possessions. Norman Naimark, author of ‘The Russians in Germany,’
a book analyzing rape within war, explains that the rape of a woman is a
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“theoretical castration of men who couldn’t protect their women” (1995).
This is a perpetuation of Brownmiller’s argument that “the body of a raped
woman becomes a ceremonial battlefield” (1975). As the battleground,
women are used as a platform for soldiers to attack and discipline enemy
combatants (Secretary‐General, 2006). Thus, SEA, in the framework of
security organizations, may be a crucial manifestation of militarized
masculinity, an aggressive form of masculinity needed for warrior culture to
flourish (Enloe, 1990). SEA is common in military establishments because the
military’s administrative design is split based on gender (division of labor)
and is male controlled (proportionately). That said, the military uses the
gender division and hegemonic masculinity as a way to inflict authority over
the use of violence (Stiehm, 2001). In ‘Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist
Perspectives,’ Sjoberg and Via, assistant professors at University of Florida
and Ferrum College, mention that productive combat demands the warrant
of hegemonic masculinities, combativeness, conformity, stoicism, and
allegiance over feminine behavior (2010).
Some feminist scholars, such as Cynthia Enloe (2000) and Sandra
Whitworth (2004) argue that masculinity of male soldiers adjusts throughout
their training course, conceiving a specific character they call “militarized
masculinity.” “Militarized masculinity” is a mixture of characteristics and
attitudes that are hyper‐masculine, hegemonic, and linked mostly with
military soldiers. Whitworth contends that militaries are acknowledged for
promising to “make men out of soldiers” and she conveys that people
associate the military with being able to instill manhood, while soldiering
itself comes second (2004). Further, Whitworth states that by enlisting in the
military, many men feel they are validating their manliness to others and to
themselves (2004).
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Whitworth, who has analyzed both militarism and masculinity, has
proposed that there is a distinct association between military establishments
and hegemonic portrayals of masculinity. She analyzes hegemonic
illustrations of masculinity within the military, including dehumanizing the
“enemy,” in order to become emotionally ready to defeat the opponent
during war (2004). Whitworth argues that in order to dehumanize the
enemy, one must first defeat the “other” within themselves. She states that
dehumanizing the “other” expressed as “feminine” becomes threatening, as
it can lead to violence outside the domain of military combat, such as sexual
exploitation and abuse of women (2004). In times of battle, women face a
heightened risk to their safety, partly because they are “othered” through
their gender and cultural identities (Whitworth, 2004). The belief that
soldiers deserve sexual encounters with women correlates with militarized
masculinity. In addition to the general association between militarized
masculinity and SEA within war and military institutions, an additional link
applies to peacekeeping forces.
With the expansion of more intricate peacekeeping operations,
soldiers are asked to do work that had previously been done by civilians. For
example, soldiers may be asked to advocate for human rights or coordinate
elections during peacekeeping operations (UN duties, 2016). Soldiers are
predicted to do what some consider to be everyday work that might lead to
‘identity crises’, which are demonstrated in sexual exploitation and abuse
(Carreiras, 2010). Whitworth (2004) states that when soldiers are incapable
of achieving their duty as soldiers trained for combat, they may turn to
sexual exploitation or

violence against the local population, sexual

harassment of other members of the UN mission, or even engage in human
trafficking rings.
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With sexual relationships so fixed on male peacekeeper identities,
Sarah Martin, author of ‘Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations,’ has implied that a ‘hyper‐masculine’
society that stimulates tolerance for severe sexual attitudes has increased
within peacekeeping missions (2005). Indeed, the military (and
peacekeeping operations) has brushed off misconduct as normal for a male‐
oriented establishment. For instance, in Cambodia, in the early 1990s, the
UN Special Representative of the Secretary‐General, Yasushi Akashi,
acknowledged worries about sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers to
NGOs by saying, “boys will be boys” (Simm, 2013).
In spite of the UN’s zero tolerance policy and clear notice against SEA
by peacekeepers, it is still a crucial issue during peacekeeping missions.
There continues to be an immense level of transactional sex that could be
seen as an exchange of gifts, favors, or money for sex, between
peacekeepers and regional women. Thus, when men participate in
transactional sex, they may be more likely to enact sexual abuse or rape
(Dunkle et al., 2006). Nordås and Rustad, authors of “Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation,” introduced the earliest
statistical study that examines the problem of what can account for
fluctuations in recorded SEA within peacekeeping operations. Their analysis
suggests that SEA is more common in larger missions, in less developed host
countries, and in conflicts with fewer battle‐related deaths (Nordås and
Rustad 2013).
This paper seeks to discover a way to alleviate SEA related to
diminishing patriarchal ideals and militarized masculinity by investigating the
potential effects of gender mainstreaming on SEA by peacekeepers. Gender
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mainstreaming has mainly been studied in relation to the increase of female
peacekeepers and involving women in peace operations. UN officials have
indicated that adding female peacekeepers may have an impact in lowering
SEA (Bridges and Horsfalls, 2009). This approach to weakening SEA offenses,
however, is restricted because the percentage of women in peacekeeping
missions is very low and is unlikely to rise in the near future because there
are more men in military institutions than women (Crawford, Lebovic, and
Macdonald, 2015).
Despite the significance of adding more women to peacekeeping
operations, it cannot be concluded that increasing the amount of women is
an acceptable solution to SEA. Firstly, as Johanna Valenius, author of “A Few
Kind Women: Gender Essentialism and Nordic Peacekeeping Operation,”
asserts that since peacekeeping personnel currently have growing contact
with the local communities, there is an increasing urgency for awareness
about the duties men and women have in their host country (, 2007).
Broadening the awareness on gender issues through gender mainstreaming
will be displayed within the theoretical argument.
Theoretical Argument
This theoretical argument will outline two terms that will be used
throughout the paper and then a clarification of how gender mainstreaming
is thought to affect SEA perpetuated by peacekeepers. The correlation is
made clear with the following theories: the feminist theory, militarized
masculinity, and group culture. Researchers like Martin (2005) have
mentioned that the group culture that emerges when peacekeeping forces
are established generates a masculine norm which can create tolerance for
SEA. SEA, or Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, is characterized as “any actual or
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attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust,
for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily,
socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (SGB, 2003).
Sexual abuse details “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual
nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions” (SGB,
2003).
A possible solution would be establishing gender equality, or Gender
Mainstreaming, within these masculine spaces, thus creating a path to
lessen SEA. Gender Mainstreaming is an approach that was enacted in 2001
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to guarantee that gender
viewpoint is acknowledged in all work (UN gender, 2016). While
peacekeeping operations are comprised of a mixture of state militaries,
Whitworth admits that each military has a shared commonality between
masculine systems (2004). Presently, peacekeeping camps are masculine
territories. The camps are ruled by men and, more accurately, are
surrounded by a militaristic kind of masculinity. Although this militaristic
masculinity is not something all men and women within the operation define
themselves with, everyone has to abide by it to get by in day‐to‐day life.
The feminist theory created by Mary Wollstonecraft, author of “A
vindication of the rights of woman,” targets women’s ability to advocate for
equality through their actions (1996). This research displays many examples
in which the women of the population are challenged with ideals dictating
that they are, by some means, inferior than men, and thus, not given equal
opportunities. For this reason, women are seen as lesser. By examining the
SEA through a liberal feminist theory, the injustices in UN peacekeeping
missions are more quickly identified and the problems that the female
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community are challenged with, like rape and forced prostitution, display
how women are subjected to an inferior role. The liberal feminist theory
additionally mentions that women’s subordination is grounded in legalized
restraints that limit women’s access to success (Mudzingwa, 2013). Many of
the undeveloped countries where UN peacekeeping operations have been
occupied have transmitted female subordination as a “traditional” family
quality and adopted them as justifications to forbid women from advancing
in the society.
The militarized masculinity theory, coined by Sandra Whitworth,
asserts that the masculine roles and beliefs instilled on young men in the
military; characterizing some of the most combative, prejudiced, and
destructive elements of men, are to blame for offensive conduct during
peacekeeping missions (2004). Many feminist theorists consider the rise of
hyper‐masculine characteristics in the military as the prime perpetrator
surrounding repeating abuse in peacekeeping missions (Lopes 2013, 5).
According to Whitworth, soldiers are not innate, they are made; and a piece
of what goes into the creation of a soldier is the glorification and support of
some of the most threatening and shaky features of masculinity: those that
advocate “violence, misogyny, homophobia, and racism” (Whitworth, 2004).
This creation of a warrior, prepared to attack on demand, helps men endure
war and brutal combat, but can quickly turn to extreme and entitled
attitudes outside those military circumstances (Lopes, 2013).
Military institutions are hierarchical and possess a rigid chain of
command. In 2005, the UN announced an extensive release by Prince Zeid
Ra‟ad Al Hussein, prior UN peacekeeper, who examined and implemented
suggestions for the zero tolerance policy (Prince, 2005). The release
indicated the first time that there was an exhaustive examination into the
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issue of sexual exploitation during a peacekeeping mission. Yet, in Prince
Zeid Ra‟ad Al Hussein’s release, he mentioned that whenever the UN begins
an investigation into an accusation, UN peacekeepers, in addition to officers
of high rank, do whatever they can to block the investigation (Prince, 2005).
It is not abnormal for peacekeepers to attempt to payoff eyewitnesses into
altering their statement, intimidate investigators and withhold naming
accused persons (Prince, 2005). One female soldier, characterizing her
involvement with a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, states that once she
found out that trafficking by UN soldiers had become rampant, she tried to
warn the appropriate authorities (Bolkovac and Lynn, 2011). Her officer
instantly lowered her in rank and the whole unit tried to vilify her (Bolkovac
and Lynn, 2011).
Inside the framework of a peacekeeping mission, there is no
supervision of units of troops and, frequently, a state will note an absence
of proof when challenged about the lack of any evidence (Aoláin, 2011).
Sadly, only the most notorious cases that captivate the international press
are prone to draw in any actual penalties. It has even been discussed that
the repercussions of SEA involving women and children are so small that
men enter peacekeeping missions as a kind of sexual travel (Aoláin, 2011).
The militarized masculinity theory goes on to convey that sexually abusing
women becomes a method for the soldiers to socially connect and to confirm
their masculinity. These acts can establish a surrounding in which behaviors,
ideas, and feelings that are usually not recognized as suitable, become
tolerable (Rubinstein, 2008).
In peacekeeping forces, the theory of group culture, formulated by
Sarah Martin, introduces compliance for severe sexual behavior. Individuals
of social groups usually act from cultural standards which involve
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understanding the “acceptable” way of acting in their surroundings and
establishing emotional reactions to their encounters (2005). In order to act
in an appropriate way within a cultural standard, one must understand the
standards by observing and acting within the group (Rubinstein, 2008). For
instance, Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, authors of “On The Frontlines: Gender,
War, and Post‐Conflict Process,” suggest that the kind of group bonding
needed to create a unified and stable military unit can coincide to the
proclivity of men inciting other men to do risky actions, including sexually
abusing women (Aoláin et al, 2011).
The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325,
enacted in 2000, was the earliest pursuit to focus on the problem of sexual
violence and exploitation of women in war zones and to demand for the
addition of women in peacekeeping operations (Ghimire, 2017). The
inclination was evident that women are unjustly harmed by conflict, and
when women are removed from the peacekeeping operations, the result
ignores gendered needs in the rebuilding process and possibly adds to
maintained volatility.
For example, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia started in
1992 and operating until 1993, but did not contain any women peacekeepers
(Ghimire, 2017). During the mission, Cambodia experienced extreme
amounts of prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual assault, and
romantic relationships between the host population and peacekeepers
(Ghimire, 2017). The peacekeepers that committed sexual violence or
exploitation unfolded the social and familial frameworks for some civilians,
leaving countless Cambodians with the impression that peacekeepers had
arrived only to change Cambodian women into sex workers (Ghimire, 2017).
The lack of women peacekeepers made it hard for Cambodians to disclose
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occurrences of sexual violence or exploitation committed against them by
peacekeepers, which negatively impacted the mission’s efforts to focus on
the impacts of the war zone on women (Whitworth, 2004). Even today, the
UN is a male controlled institution with only 13% women in executive seats
in the Secretariat by the end of 1994 (DeGroot, 2001). Further, a UN article
pointed out that, in 2010, female peacekeepers had increased to 7%, and
female military officers had risen to 2%. During 2012‐2015, 3% in the military
were women and 10% of peacekeepers were women (Pruitt, 2016).
Expanding the gender diversity and training in peacekeeping
operations minimizes incidents of exploitation, sexual abuse, and violence
against women in war and volatile post‐war territories for at least two
reasons. First, the host population is less probable to regard women as
trespassers or subjugators and they have a civilizing impact, characterizing a
resemblance of a home community with similar norms that could lessen SEA
(Olsson, L., Tryggestad, T. L. eds., 2001). Second, a peacekeeping force
comprised of women and men seems less threatening to the host population
than just men. Under the prevailing idea of UN gender mainstreaming,
involving more women in male‐dominated missions enhances the
appearance of the peacekeeping force within the host population (DeGroot,
2001).
The existence of women active in deployed military and police units
creates proximity to real life and, therefore, decreases the combative
inclinations of peacekeepers who may alternatively find themselves
influenced by the violent, hyper‐masculine essence of post‐conflict volatility
(Carvajal, 2010). Yet, it is not just about adding women into missions. Gender
mainstreaming must be practiced on the ground, and within the training
sites, to have any real benefit. If gender mainstreaming can establish a new
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group culture with principles and advocate a different behavior from the
common masculine trend of peacekeepers, the tactic might work in
minimizing SEA. Therefore, the hypothesis is: The more gender
mainstreaming is enforced in a UN peacekeeping operation, the less SEA will
be executed by the military peacekeeping personnel.
Methods
This research implements a qualitative study looking at two different
cases using the method of structured focused comparison. The structured
focused comparison is a method utilizing a list of fixed questions. The same
list of questions is asked to each case, to provide a parameter of comparison
for results (George and Bennett, 2005). The cases are selected using the
Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) (Meckstroth, 1975). MSSD means
selecting cases that are as similar as possible in all ways except the
independent and dependent variables. Choosing cases by this method allows
for the analysis of the variable that interprets the dependent variable
(Meckstroth, 1975). To rule out other viable reasons for the incidence of SEA,
the cases will be controlled for three other components.
Firstly, the cases selected have limited variation on their TCCs. This
means each member nation of the UN, also named the troop contributing
countries (TCCs) has its own culture and norms, which prompts to
contrasting behaviors about women, sex, alcohol, etc. (Martin, 2005). The
cultural behaviors the peacekeepers carry from their home nation could
change the amount of SEA charges thus limiting the variation. The second
variable will be the size of the mission. Nordas and Rustad’s variation study
discovered that SEA is more prevalent in sizable missions (2013). The third
control variable is the amount of female peacekeepers. Women have been
systematically withheld from peacekeeping forces, as the soldiers know it
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threatens the masculinity of the mission (Sion, 2008).
The two cases chosen for this study are the United Nations Mission
in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in Sudan/United Nations
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). In this research,
UNMIS and UNMISS are treated as the same mission because when South
Sudan acquired their independence in 2011, UNMIS concluded and all
materials and personnel were moved from UNMIS to UNMISS (UNMIS 2016).
UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS were selected based on the variety of the
dependent variable, or the recorded SEA accusations in each mission. In
UNMIL, the recorded SEA accusations have dropped almost every year since
2007. In UNMIS/UNMISS, the recorded accusations have been fluctuating up
and down and there is no indication of the SEA accusations dropping
regularly (UN Stats 2016). The missions were chosen with some disparities
in how UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS worked with gender mainstreaming to
guarantee some variation in the independent variable. UNMIL and
UNMIS/UNMISS were initiated after the UN enacted gender mainstreaming
as an approach in 2001 (UN gender, 2016). Picking cases after 2001 is useful
because it will clarify the measuring of the independent variable.
The local population of Liberia and Sudan/South Sudan is another
distinction. Liberia’s host population is considerably lower than Sudan/South
Sudan with roughly 30 million more people in South Sudan (UN, 2018). This
is valuable because the population size displays the “estimated opportunity”
that UN Peacekeepers could have in committing sexual abuse within these
two cases. Similarities between the cases are that they both have had prior
peacekeeping operations (Farrall, 2012) (UN peacekeeping 2016). The time
frames for the case studies are from 2007 to 2015 and this time frame was
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chosen since prior years of when the missions were established in 2003 had
scarce SEA data.
The dependent variable will be measured as high or low by using the
Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) and their records of SEA accusations. The
independent variable of this study, gender mainstreaming, will be measured
through gender training before deployment, and gender application during
the mission. These distinct measures will display the variation in the
independent variable. Gender training before deployment is guided from
what kind of training the peacekeepers have before the missions. The UN
does not have their own military and are consequently contingent on the
member nations. Therefore, the member nations, also called ‘the troop
contributing countries’ (TCC), are accountable for the training before
deployment (UN prevention, 2016). Training before deployment is intended
to give the peacekeeping personnel all essential understanding and
expertise that is needed to be productive peacekeepers. Gender application
during the mission involves the training during the missions.
With UNSCR 1325 and the adoption of gender mainstreaming,
peacekeeping missions have been supplied with gender advisors and gender
divisions. The usual job includes observing gender proportion and supplying
gender training for mission personnel and locals during the mission. They
also promote conferences and events where local women can get organized
around social movements (Whitworth, 2004). Thus missions that focus on
gender advisors and/or divisions, along with women in powerful positions,
will be examined. With the method of structured focused comparison, I
created

five

questions

about

the

independent

and

dependent

variables,examined each case, and then analyzed how they differ.
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Gender training before deployment
I.

Is gender training operated in the TCCs before deployment? What
kind of training (discussions/classes)?

II.

Is gender training operated by the mission before deployment?
What kind of training (discussions/classes)?
Gender application during the mission

I.
II.

Are women in powerful positions?
Are gender divisions/advisors established?
SEA Question

I.

How many SEA accusations are recorded each year?

UNMIL: Independent Variable
The UNMIL operation had evidence of gender work in the entire
mission, yet, there has been fluctuation as to what degree the work has been
implemented and how it has been accepted. Liberians have asserted a
positive opinion about UNMIL. A common belief is that UNMIL ́s work, which
entailed increasing knowledge of gender issues and sexual abuse, have
lowered the amount of SEA (Nduka‐Agwu, 2009). In more current years,
UNMIL has worked more to add women in peace operations so that it
becomes a more receptive environment for men and women (Nduka‐Agwu,
2009).
The UN’s examination of how gender training is operated in the TCCs
displays that the countries of north Libera have more improved gender
training more than countries of south Libera, yet, there is a shortage of data
on how, and to what degree, the TCCs involved gender training before
deployment (Lyytikäinen, 2007). The major TCCs in UNMIL during 2007‐2015
were Bangladesh and Pakistan (UN resources, 2016). The gender training in
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Bangladesh is held by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation
Training, in which the trainers recognize every peacekeeping mission and
order is different. Still, there is no data of any particular gender training for
the peacekeepers (BIPSOT, 2003). The Peacekeeping Training Cell in the
School of Infantry and Tactics operates the peacekeeping training in
Pakistan, yet training is restricted to military peacekeepers and mostly
targeted military leaders. Training for police peacekeepers is unavailable
(Bellamy & Williams 2013). There is no evidence of any particular gender
training being operated in Pakistan (Pakistanarmy, 2016).
When UNMIL ́s sanction was drafted, the UNSCR 1325 had already
been enacted. In this manner, gender mainstreaming was already an
integrated approach in all UN peacekeeping missions. In UNMIL, this at least
produced the addition of an Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA). The OGA
organized a required two‐day gender‐training meeting for all arriving
mission personnel (Nduka‐Agwu, 2009). The training presented ways to
incorporate gender viewpoints into all strategies, decisions and plans
(Nduka‐Agwu, 2009). Over the years, the training on SEA before deployment
in UNMIL has evolved and advanced toward a more unified and extensive
training (Neudorfer, 2015).
During the time‐period 2007‐2015, UNMIL had three female heads
of mission and during 2008‐2012, UNMIL had a female as Special
Representative of the Secretary‐General (UN 2014). Also, UNMIL was the
first UN mission with an all‐female police‐unit. The unit was deployed in
2007 and the peacekeepers came from India (Ghimire, 2017). The initiative
to add more women and the acknowledgement of sexual violence has been
an important part of UNMIL ́s sanction (Dharmapuri, 2013). By 2007, UNMIL
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educated 3,360 personnel on attitudes towards and the prevention of SEA
(Neudorfer, 2012). Additionally, between 2007‐2010 various advancements
were made in SEA prevention training executed by the Conduct of Discipline
Team (CDT) (2012). In the coming years, the in‐mission training persisted to
be included and in 2010 and 2011, more than 5000 personnel had training
each year (2012). To increase knowledge about the issue with SEA, the
gender division in UNMIL had implemented a specific manager training class.
The commander’s accountability for peacekeeper’s behavior had been
highlighted, so if allegations of SEA are disclosed and the manager seems to
be passive, he or she will also be considered a perpetrator (Nduka‐Agwu
2009).
UNMIL: Dependent Variable
UNMIL acquired an overall number of 61 SEA allegations by military and
police personnel in 2007‐2015 with the topmost amount of SEA in 2009,
when the mission had 13 SEA allegations. When assessing the amount of
accusations each year, it became clear that the amount of SEA has lowered
every year since 2007, except for 2009 (UN stats, 2016). The zero‐tolerance
policy appears to have had fluctuating impact on SEA by peacekeepers. On
one hand, it appears the prostitution has remained unchanged however, the
data displayed that brutal kinds of SEA had been lowered (Neudorfer, 2015).
A survey administered in Monrovia, Liberia in 2012 displayed that
transactional sex was very prevalent among women aged 18‐30 years old
(Beber et al, 2016). With the population of Liberia being roughly 49% female,
over half (58%) of the women had been entangled in a sexual transaction
with UN personnel for money (Beber et al, 2016; UN, 2018).
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UNMIS/UNMISS: Independent variable
UNMIS/UNMISS was initiated in 2005, the same year that the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations set up the CDT and began to train
peacekeepers by the zero‐tolerance policy (Karim & Beardsley 2016). This
implies that before deployment an in‐mission initiation training was required
for all peacekeeping personnel. Yet, the TCCs were accountable for having
training before deployment for military and police peacekeepers (UN
prevention, 2016). The degree of gender training in the TCCs for
UNMIS/UNMISS is similar to the results for UNMIL. Since two of the major
TCCs in both UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS are Bangladesh and Pakistan, they
are partly alike (UN resources, 2016). The third major TCC in UNMIS/UNMISS
is India, which has begun to give tailored training for their female
peacekeepers (UN India 201; UN resources, 2016). Since 2011, UN women in
India formed over 20 training meetings on gender (2013). The training
sessions targeted sexual or gendered violence, how to prevent it, and how
to react; however, India did not have any gender training for men and it is
evident that sexual assault is not just a woman’s problem (2013). Also,
India ́s female peacekeepers only amounted to 1‐3 percent of the force in
UNMISS during 2011‐2012, so their training was hardly notable (UN
resources, 2016).
However, UNMIS/UNMISS got their first female head of mission in
2011(UN South Sudan 2016). When UNMIS was initiated, the Office of the
Gender Advisor had been created already. Yet, there is a lack of in‐mission
training data in Sudan and South Sudan. As reported by the UN Security
council ́s report of the Secretary‐General on South Sudan, 140 UNMISS
personnel had been trained on gender mainstreaming in 2012. Also,
UNMIS/UNMISS had a noticeable issue with UN personnel harming children,
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which prompted the UN to initiate the UNMISS Child Protection Unit, which
works to defend children from sexual violence (UNMISS 2016). The Unit is
operated in association with the government, the United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other collaborators
(2016). The division’s intention is to guard children from conflict; however,
it is not stated if children are guarded from UN too (2016).
UNMIS/UNMISS: Dependent variable
UNMIS/UNMISS have acquired 29 SEA accusations by military and
police personnel in 2007‐2015. The population size in Sudan roughly was
around 37 million during that time frame, exceeding UNMIL’s population size
while exhibiting less SEA accusations (UN, 2018). Even though there were a
lesser amount of SEA accusations in UNMIS/UNMISS compared to UNMIL,
there was no apparent decline in SEA by peacekeepers over 2007‐2015. Each
year, the SEA accusations were fluctuating, with the largest amount of
accusations being 7 and the lowest being 1 (UN stats 2016). In 2007, they
had already questioned 13 peacekeepers for offenses and 4 Bangladeshi
peacekeepers had been shipped home with related accusations (BCC 2007).
There have also been various allegations of UNMIS/UNMISS peacekeeping
personnel sexually assaulting children (FOXNEWS 2007).

Comparison
The case studies display a variation in both the amount and kind of
SEA that has been perpetuated by peacekeepers. UNMIL and
UNMIS/UNMISS are two out of four UN peacekeeping missions that have
had the highest amount of SEA accusations (Inspection, 2015). Analysis of
the dependent variable with data from CDU displayed that UNMIL have had
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a dropping number of SEA allegations during the time‐period 2007‐2015.
UNMIS/UNMISS, however, have had a fluctuating amount of SEA during the
same time‐period. Additionally, investigation revealed that UNMIL ́s
personnel have been entangled in transactional sex with a high amount of
Liberian women. At the same time, UNMIS/UNMISS acquired allegations of
abusing children with records of SEA accusations of UNMIS personnel
directly after arrival (FOXNEWS 2007). Examining the results of the
independent variable, there is some correlation in how both missions have
executed work with gender mainstreaming. Both missions were initiated in
the twenty first century when gender mainstreaming and the zero‐tolerance
policy had become an incorporated portion of a mission. Yet, the data
revealed that UNMIL had a more extensive record of gender training during
the mission than UNMIS/UNMISS. UNMIL reacted to the issue of SEA by
broadening the gender training and adding more personnel. There has been
a consistent expansion of gender training in UNMIL during the time‐period
of this study. Yet, the reaction of UNMIS/UNMISS is that the gender training
that has been operated is primarily the requirements of protocol from the
UN without further implementation.
The hypothesis of this research stated that ‘the more gender
mainstreaming is incorporated in a UN peacekeeping operation, the less
SEA will occur by military peacekeeping personnel’. In UNMIL, the gender
training continued during the mission, began to involve more personnel,
and raised awareness for gender issues, while the level of SEA continually
lowered. In contrast, the gender training in UNMIS/UNMISS had not been
as extensive as it was in UNMIL and the amount of SEA in UNMIS/UNMISS
had been fluctuating without a steady decrease. The data provides some
backing to the hypothesis but it is not sufficient enough to confirm
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anything. To conclude if this thesis is supported additional research will
need to be done. The tables below display that was found.

(UN STATS 2016 & UN 2018)
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Conclusion
The intention of this research was to qualitatively analyze the effect
of gender mainstreaming on SEA committed by peacekeepers. The study
focuses on finding solutions to SEA instead of analyzing the causes of SEA
that has mainly been researched. The main conclusion of the study
demonstrates that gender mainstreaming has the largest effect on SEA when
it is carried out as gender training during the mission. The cases are
comparable in most features of gender mainstreaming except for the
training that was coordinated during the mission. The evidence displays that
UNMIL has had more extensive and established gender training during the
mission than UNMIS/UNMISS. Additionally, SEA has dropped in UNMIL,
while in UNMIS/UNMISS the amount has been fluctuating during the whole
time‐period.
A weakness of this study includes other explanations for the amount
of SEA. For instance, the amount of SEA could be an economic need by the
host population. For example, in Liberia many women were entangled in
transactional sex with peacekeepers, so the amount of SEA by peacekeepers
could be related to women ́s efforts to enhance their economic status.
Another weakness was that gathering data on UNMIL was much easier than
for UNMIS/UNMISS. The bulk of data for UNMIS/UNMISS was collected by
the UN, which leads to a potential bias issue. Clearly, the UN wants to
illustrate a positive image, which may develop in the record of gender
mainstreaming that is fabricated. For further research, it would be beneficial
to advance this study by looking at many cases with contrasting variations in
gender mainstreaming and SEA.
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To conclude, there is an obligation to broaden gender training for all
peacekeeping personnel and take action to increase the attention and
understanding about gender issues around the globe. Not only is this a
women’s issue, but also a worldwide issue that impacts all people,
communities, and institutions. We need additional policies that advocate for
the inclusion of every gender and perspective in order to truly penetrate the
hyper‐masculine norms and disciplines that surround peacekeeping, thereby
better serving the nations that need protection.
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COUNTRY: An Evaluation of the Relationship Between Higher Education
in Women and Economic Development
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which higher
education for women influences economic development in Bangladesh.
Two models using OLS regressions were employed to evaluate the
strengths of two critical relationships. The first probed the connection
between higher education in women and the Female Labour Force
Participation Rate (FLFPR), while the second tested the relationship
between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The first key
finding is that there is no statistically significant relationship between
higher education in women and FLFPR. The second main finding is that
there is a statistically significant relationship between higher education in
women and GDP per capita. The results imply that a good path forward in
Bangladesh’s development may lie in making more concentrated efforts to
strengthen female tertiary education programs.

Introduction
At the age of 17, Afroza Khatun did something that girls in Bangladesh
rarely do, refused her marriage proposal.1 Like many girls her age, she had
a strong desire for pursuing higher education, and knew that an early
marriage would make this dream unobtainable. It took courage to resist
the formidable custom and community pressure that is prevalent
throughout Bangladesh. Unfortunately, 75% of girls in Bangladesh are
married before turning 18, and about 33% are married before the age of

1

Naimul Haq, “Afroza’s story: refusing marriage, choosing education” last modified January,

2010.
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15.2 Child marriage is one of the most significant impediments to women
attaining a higher education. In the case of Afroza, UNICEF and BRAC’s
Adolescent Empowerment Project Program informed her community of the
rights and laws protecting adolescent girls, reminding them that it is illegal
for girls to get married prior to the age of 18.3 As a result of this initiative,
her refusal to being married was accepted by her community, and Afroza
now has the luxury of being able to focus on her studies.
Broadening the scope to Bangladesh as a whole, improving higher
education in women not only benefits the human capital and well-being of
impoverished girls like Afroza, but it also provides dividends for everyone in
the country. For instance, according to the World Bank, “the economic
returns for higher education graduates are the highest in the entire
education system- an estimated 17 percent increase in earnings as
compared with 10 percent for primary and 7 percent for secondary
education.”4 Furthermore, advancing higher education for women has the
additional benefits of future children having higher quality healthcare and
education, bolstered participation in the labour market, and fewer
children.5 The key question this research paper seeks to answer is: to what
extent does higher education for women influence economic development
in Bangladesh? The main argument is that higher education for women to a
great extent influences economic development in Bangladesh through both
its strong effect on GDP per capita and its relationship to the female labour
force participation rate.

2

Ibid.
Ibid.
4 The World Bank, “Higher Education” last modified October 5, 2017.
5 The World Bank, “Girls’ Education” last modified September 25, 2017.
3
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Moving forward, this paper will be divided into the following sections:
Literature Review, Data Description for Model 1, Model 1 Econometric
Methodology & Results, Model 2 Econometric Methodology & Results, and
Conclusion. In the Literature Review section, three essential research
papers will be examined, which provide insight on the relationship
between education in women and the female labour force participation
rate. The analysis will build and extend from their findings. In Data
Description for Model 1, important graphs and tables of the data for the
first model will be illustrated, contextualized, and explained. In the
Econometric Methodology sections for both models, the reasoning behind
the parameters of the linear regression analyses will be revealed, and their
two respective research hypotheses that the female labour force
participation rate will be influenced by higher education in women and that
the GDP per capita will be significantly affected by higher education in
women will be analyzed.
In the Results portion of each model, all of the key findings from the
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) tests will be displayed and followed
by an in-depth discussion of their implications and limitations. Finally, in
the Conclusion section, the chief findings of the research and future
avenues of study will be presented, as well as policy recommendations
designed to expedite Bangladesh’s quest to become a middle-income
country. Before moving onto the method and analysis, it is vital to review
the previous literature on women’s education in Bangladesh.

Literature Review
In Mohammad Hossain and Clement Tisdell’s academic article,
“Closing the gender gap in Bangladesh: inequality in education,
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employment, and earnings,” they aimed to assess trends in the status of
women with regards to a few macro-level indicators, some of which are:
educational attainments, women’s labour force participation, and earnings
alongside men. When evaluating the correlation between women’s
education and workforce participation, their estimated correlation
coefficients highlighted two key findings. The most pertinent of the two, for
the purpose of this paper, was that there was near perfect correlation
(1.06) between Female-Male Enrollment Ratio (FMER) and Urban FemaleMale Labour Force (FMLFU), indicating a positive association between
closing the gender gap in education and closing the gender gap in labour
force participation.6 Hossain and Tisdell were quick to caution, however,
that the reasons behind this association need further investigation. They
stressed how educational access leading to a convergence in male and
female productivity (according to Human capital theory7) cannot be
assumed because most formal employment in Bangladesh consists of
unskilled or low-skilled jobs.8
The most significant result derived from this study, one that pertains
to the topic discussed, is that there is a strong correlation between female
labour force participation and women’s education. That there exists a
strong correlation between higher education in women in Bangladesh and
the female labour force participation rate is of critical interest to the

6

Mohammad A. Hossain and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh:

Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings,” International Journal of Social Economics
32, no. 5 (2005): 450
7

Human capital theory refers to the “aggregate stock of competencies, knowledge, social, and

personal attributes embodied in the ability to create intrinsic and measurable economic value.”
For more, consult Becker (1993).
8

Ibid.
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paper’s investigation. The author’s analysis, presentation of, and cautions
to this finding will be imperative when interpreting the results. In
particular, being mindful of the alternative reasons they proposed to
explain this correlation, reasons such as education serving as a useful
screening device for employers, and increased education leading to a rise in
women’s confidence in pursuing employment, will be of great importance.9
Further, the women’s rise in high-skilled job participation and the
narrowing of gender earning gaps are both promising signs of progress
being made for women, which can be juxtaposed with Bangladesh’s
progress in development.
In Humaira Husain’s academic paper, “Economic development,
women empowerment, and U shaped labour force function: time series
evidence for Bangladesh,” he provides support for the legitimacy of the
nonlinear quadratic U-shaped function between economic growth and the
female labour force participation rate in Bangladesh over the time period
of 1991-2012. Husain examines the U hypothesis10 by applying both OLS
and instrumental variable approach to estimate the equation of FLFPR11,
utilizing two regressors: natural log of per capita real GDP and the square
of natural log of per capita real GDP (per capita real GDP is accepted widely

9

Mohammad A Hossain. and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh:

Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings,” International Journal of Social Economics
32, no. 5 (2005): 450-451
10

The U hypothesis is a “relationship between womens’ educational attainment and advances of

economic development,” where the “declining portion of U is explained by the income effect”
and the “rising portion of the U is explained by the substitution effect.” For more see Husain
(2016), p. 720.
11

Female Labour Force Participation Rate.
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as a proxy for economic growth).12 Husain also incorporates the three
major GDP sectors as explanatory variables: agriculture, manufacturing,
and service. The key result found relevant to the hypothesis was that the
estimated coefficient of service value added was found to be both positive
and statistically significant, indicating that more women are obtaining
white collar jobs in both the public and private sector.13 Husain concluded
that female labour participation accelerated economic growth in
Bangladesh, and recommended giving women better access to high quality
education and more effective job training in order to raise women
empowerment and female labour force participation.
The analysis and results of this article relate to the topic lies within the
finding that female labour force participation has a positive impact on
economic growth in Bangladesh. As higher education for women is one of
the key factors in the female labour force participation rate, it is likely that
higher education for women also has an effect, albeit to a different degree,
on economic growth in Bangladesh. Moreover, the author attributes
women’s advancement above secondary level education to be a possible
cause of more women being absorbed in white collar jobs. This finding is
valuable because it reveals another avenue that can be taken in exploring
the relationship between higher education for women and economic
development: testing the strength of the relationship between women’s
progress above secondary level education and the obtainment of more
white collar jobs.

12

Humaira Husain. “Economic Development, Women Empowerment, and U Shaped Labour

Force Function: Time Series Evidence For Bangladesh,” Asian Economic and Financial Review 6,
no. 12 (2016): 721
13

Ibid, p. 724.
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In Rushidan Rahman and Rizwanul Islam’s working paper, “Female
Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh: Trends, Drivers and Barriers,”
they explore the legitimacy of the hypothesized U-shaped relationship
between economic growth and women’s employment, as well as the
underpinnings of other drivers and impediments to labour force
participation in Bangladeshi women. One of their chief findings is that
evidence from Bangladesh does not, in fact, support the U-shaped
hypothesis, with a rise in female labour force participation taking place
with accelerated economic growth since the 1990s.14 Another significant
finding uncovered was that the elasticity of employment growth, with
regards to output growth, increased sizably for women in the 2nd half of the
2000s, despite declining for the overall population15. This suggests sizable
progress has been made for female participation in the labour force and
warrants further inquiry.
Of particular interest in this working paper is its insight on the
relationship between women’s education and the female labour force
participation rate. After performing a logit regression analysis in order to
assess the connection between education and the FLFPR, while controlling
for household assets, they discovered that the four levels of education
(primary, secondary, above secondary, and technical) have gradually
increasing positive coefficients.16 Furthermore, education as a whole had a
positive impact, with the reasoning being that education leads to an
increase in productivity, which thereby raises wages/salary, and then

14

Rushidan I. Rahman and Rizwanul Islam. “Female Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh:

Trends, Drivers and Barriers,” ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series, (2013): xi
15

Ibid, p. xi.

16

Ibid, p. 36.
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increases FLFPR by its substitution effect.17 The intent of the paper is to
build off in particular Rahman & Islam’s and Hossain & Tisdell’s findings on
the relationship between women education and FLFPR, by honing in on
higher education in particular, evaluating the magnitude of its influence on
not only growth (by using FLFPR as a proxy), but economic development as
well. Before delving into the econometric methodology and the analysis of
the first model, the data that will be utilized must first be described.

Data Description for Model 1
The data from which the analysis for the first model will be performed
is derived from from two sources. The first provides female educational
attainment for population aged 15 and over in Bangladesh from the years
1950-2010 in 5 year intervals. This was obtained from the Barro-Lee
Educational Attainment Dataset, which provides data for seven levels of
schooling: no schooling, incomplete primary, complete primary, incomplete
secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary.
In addition, it gives the average years of total, primary, secondary, and
tertiary schooling alongside the population of female students in
Bangladesh for each year in the five-year intervals. The data for incomplete
and complete tertiary educational attainment will be of significant value
when evaluating the magnitude of the relationship between higher
education for women and the female labour force participation rate. Below
is a table of the aforementioned data, and on the following page there is a
graph documenting the trends of female educational attainment in
Bangladesh
17

from

the

time

period

of

1950-2010:

The substitution effect in this context refers to the phenomenon of how “a rise in wage rates

may persuade women to substitute leisure with work.” Ibid.
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Table 1: Bangladesh Female Educational Attainment (%, 15+) 19502010

Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.

Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.
In the figure above, a few key trends are worth noting. First, from
Year 6 to Year 13 (1975 to 2010) there was a significant decline (53.7%) in
the percentage of women with no schooling. Second, from Year 6 to Year
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13 (1975-2010) there was a significant incline (>30%) in the percentage of
women with total or completed secondary education level attainment. The
most plausible explanation for such a drastic shift is the procurement of
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Third, although difficult to observe
from the scaling of the figure, total and completed tertiary education
attainment increased by 2% and 3% respectively from Year 5 to Year 13
(1970-2010). While this seems quite small when compared to the percent
changes in the secondary and no schooling levels, it is important to note
that for quite some time, zero women had attained higher education. With
total and complete tertiary levels continuously increasing since 1970, this
paper seeks to investigate what impact this specific change has had on
economic development.
The second main resource for the data belongs to the International
Labour Organization database, and was accessed through the World Bank
Databank. They provided estimates for the female and male labour force
participation rate for ages 15 and up in Bangladesh from the years 1960 to
2010. It must be stated that the data provided by ILO is not as complete as
that from Barro-Lee, in that no information was given for the years: 1950,
1955, 1965, and 1970. Therefore, the sample size is considerably smaller,
and this limitation will be evaluated in greater detail during the Results and
Conclusion section. Below is a table with the female and male labour force
participation rates data in addition to a graph for displaying noteworthy
trends from 1960-2010:
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Table 2: Female vs. Male labour force participation rate (% of population,
ages 15+) in Bangladesh 1960-2010

Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour
Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016.

Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour
Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016.
Two important observations can be made from the figure above. First,
while the male labour force participation rate has been relatively flat (small
decline) over the course of fifty years, the female labour force participation
rate has had more volatility. The most striking finding is the more than six71
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fold increase between 1985 and 1990. It is also worth noting the 20%
decrease that has occurred in the FLFPR from the time period of 1990 to
2010. In addition, while the MLFPR has always been sizably greater than
the FLFPR, the gap between the two shrank considerably since the 19851990 FLFPR growth spurt. Determining the magnitude to which and
understanding why higher education in women affects the female labour
force participation rate, may help lead to more effective policy measures
being taken to shrink the labour force participation rate gap further in the
future. Now that we have a clearer picture of the data, the econometric
methodology and analysis can be introduced for the first model.

Econometric Methodology for Model 1
The research hypothesis being tested in Model 1 is that the female
labour force participation rate will be influenced by higher education in
women. The null hypothesis is that the female labour force participation
rate will not be influenced by higher education in women. The simple
principle model that will be tested is the following:

where FLFPR (the dependent variable) is the female labour force
participation rate (in %),

is the FLFPR intercept,

variable) is total tertiary education for women,
coefficient) for
variables, and

,

though

(the independent
is the slope (Beta

are the coefficients for the 11 control

is the residual. The value of

is critical, because it will

indicate the magnitude of the hypothesized relationship between higher
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education for women and FLFPR. Dependent upon this value, it can be
extrapolated how significant of a role higher education for women in
Bangladesh plays for determining FLFPR, as well as its potential impact on
economic development.

is predicted to be positive (

, based on

the findings and evidence from some of the key literature of the literature
review, which found education for women to have a positive association
and impact on the female labour force participation rate.
In order to best observe the relationship between FLFPR and higher
education in women given the data described previously, an ordinary least
squares regression test will be performed, with total (incomplete) tertiary
educational attainment as the explanatory variable

. All other variables

will be held constant: no schooling, total and complete primary, total and
complete secondary, complete tertiary, population, GDP per capita,
remittance (% of GDP), exports (% of GDP), and export growth. Evaluating
the strength of the relationship can shed insight on whether or not higher
education in women should be more strongly emphasized and targeted in
future policymaking. Furthermore, an ordinary least squares regression was
chosen because the dependent variable, FLFPR, is not a “0/1” indicator
variable; the regressors of total and complete tertiary education are
exogenous and the data is normally distributed. Below is a summary of the
number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum of the FLFPR, total female tertiary, and 11 control variables
computed in STATA:
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As can be observed above, the FLFPR from 1960-2010 in Bangladesh
has quite a large standard deviation compared to the total tertiary variable.
This is not surprising given the sharp rise that occurred in the FLFPR
between 1985 and 1990. From the above summary, it is also clear that the
total tertiary variable has a smaller variance than the FLFPR variable, which
will be something important to keep in mind when analyzing the results of
the OLS regression tests. Now that the econometric methodology and
summary statistics have been articulated, the results of the findings can be
presented and evaluated.

Results for Model 1
Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with FLFPR
as the dependent variable and the total tertiary educational attainment
levels as the explanatory variable for the model:
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Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.

The first piece of information worth interpreting is the R-squared
value of 0.6124 and the adjusted R-squared value of 0.5571. The R-squared
is a metric that describes how close the data are compared to the fitted
regression line and can be defined as the percentage of variation in
responses for the dependent variable. In this case, only 61.24% of the
model explains the variability of the response data. It is important to note
the critical limitations of the R-squared metric, which dictate that it cannot
ascertain whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates are
biased. Thus, the 0.6124 result should not be taken at face value.
Furthermore, given that total tertiary level education and the Female
Labour Force Participation Rate are dealing with human behavior, a high Rsquared value is not to be expected.
The next key result is the Prob > F value of 0.0127. This value is less
than the p-value for total tertiary, 0.013, which suggests that there is not
sufficient evidence that the regression model fits the data better than a
null model with no independent variable. From this, it can be inferred that
the model’s predictions are not an improvement versus using the mean,
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and that the correlation between total tertiary level education and FLFPR is
not statistically significant. Below is a graph depicting the linear regression
for total tertiary vs. FLFPR:

Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.
A third component that must be assessed in order to properly
determine if there is a strong relationship between the total tertiary
explanatory variable and FLFPR are the residual plots. If there are any nonrandom patterns in the residual plots, the regression coefficients and
quantitative results cannot be trusted. On the following page is an
illustration of the residual plots for this OLS regression test:
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Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.

Inspecting the residual plot closely, we can observe that there is no
clear pattern around zero for the complete range of fitted values. Normally,
from this observation, it can be deduced that the residuals are random in
the regression analysis and that the regression coefficients can be trusted.
However, given the very small sample size, it is difficult to discern the
degree to which the residuals are random. Thus, nothing conclusive
regarding the trustworthiness of the regression coefficients can be drawn.
The fourth result to analyze is the actual regression coefficient value,
juxtaposed with the p-value. The p-value for this regression is 0.013, which
is smaller than the significance level of 0.05. Typically, from this finding it
would follow that the total tertiary predictor variable is statistically
significant. However, because the Prob > F value is less than the p-value,
we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that total tertiary has no
correlation with the female labour force participation rate. Additionally,
because the regression coefficient is about 14.428, there seems to be a
positive relationship between total tertiary and FLFPR. For each 1%
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increase in the level of total tertiary education, the FLFPR increases by
approximately 14.4%.
While this overall result is not significant, it is still vital to discuss some
of the serious limitations of this regression test. The largest limitation lies in
the small sample size of the data. Unfortunately, the Female Labour Force
Participation rates for Bangladesh could only be found for nine different
years that overlap with the data available for trends in total tertiary
education attainment. Thus, even if there was a positive correlation
between the total tertiary level and FLFPR, which there is not, the strength
and magnitude of the relationship could not be calibrated with confidence.
Another limitation is the inconclusive reading of the residual plot, making it
unknown to what degree and whether or not there is stochastic error. To
gain a better understanding of the influence of higher education in women
on economic development, we must turn to Model 2.

Econometric Methodology for Model 2
The research hypothesis being tested in Model 2 focuses on how the
GDP per capita (in current US dollars) will be affected by higher education
in women. The null hypothesis is that the GDP per capita will not be
affected by higher education in women. Although economic development
can be measured in a multitude of ways, it was decided that GDP per capita
was the most appropriate metric due to both the density and volatility of
Bangladesh’s population. While the Human Development Index and
Multidimensional Poverty Index take a more holistic approach and can give
a more in depth examination of poverty and economic development,
adequate amounts of data were not obtained within such measures in
order to cover the scope required for the study. Because female tertiary
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enrollment per 100,000 inhabitants was found to have the largest quantity
of data available to track changes in higher education levels for women
between 1970 to 2014, it was chosen as the independent variable, after
examining a wide range of women tertiary education indicators (see
appendix).
Due to GDP per capita being influenced by a variety of factors, it is
critical that a sufficient number of variables are controlled in order to
properly calibrate the degree to which higher education plays a role in
influencing this key metric for economic development. The control
variables selected are: female enrollment in primary education, male
enrollment in primary education, female enrollment in secondary
education, male enrollment in secondary education, male enrollment in
tertiary education, GDP per capita growth, life expectancy at birth,
population, exports (% of GDP), remittances (% of GDP), and export
growth. Below is the regression model that will later be tested:

where
capita rate,

(the dependent variable) is the GDP per
is the GDPpercapita intercept,

is female enrollment in tertiary education,
for
and

,

through

(the independent variable)
is the slope (Beta coefficient)

are the coefficients for the eleven control variables,

is the residual. The value of

is critical because it will indicate the

magnitude of the hypothesized relationship between higher education for
women and GDP per capita. Depending upon this value, the significance of
the role of higher education for women in Bangladesh on economic
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development can be extrapolated.

is predicted to be positive,

,

based on the findings and evidence from some of the key literature cited,
which found that education for women has a positive association and
impact on economic growth and development.
Just like the previous model, an OLS regression will again be utilized to
test this relationship. Below is a summary of the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, and maximum of the dependent, independent, and control
variables:

An important thing to note from the summary above, besides the
wide range in standard deviation, mean, and minimum/maximum, is the
significantly higher number of observations there are for this model
compared to the previous one. As a result of having higher degrees of
freedom, resulting from having a larger sample size, the results from the
ensuing regression analysis will be more statistically significant than the
previous model.18

18

Refer to appendix at the end of paper to see the data that was used for the regression analysis
in Model 2.
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Results for Model 2
Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with GDP
per capita as the dependent variable and female tertiary as the explanatory
variable of the model:

Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The first results that stands out is the R-squared value of 0.9551 and
the adjusted R-squared value of 0.9536. While this 0.9551 value is
extraordinarily high and indicates that 95.51% of the model explains the
variability of the response data, it is inherently limited in that it cannot
distinguish whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates (in this
case, the coefficient estimate is about 0.7348) are biased. Therefore, the Rsquared value alone is unable to confirm that this result is statistically
significant. Another important piece of information to interpret is the Prob
> F value of 0. This value is equal to the p-value for female tertiary (0),
indicating the there is adequate evidence that the regression model fits the
data better than a model with no independent variable. Thus, the model’s
predictions are an improvement from using the mean, and the correlation
between female tertiary education enrollment and GDP per capita is
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statistically significant. Below is a figure illustrating the linear regression
generated by the model for female tertiary vs. GDP per capita:

Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The lack of any significant outliers in the previous figure further
supports the fact that the tested relationship is statistically significant.
Another important confirmation that must be made is to see whether or
not there are non-random patterns in the residual plots. If patterns are
determined to be non-random, it can be deduced that the regression
coefficients can be trusted. On the following page is a figure depicting the
residual plots for this OLS test:
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Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
When examining the above residual plot, there does not appear to be
a clear pattern around zero for the range of fitted values. That being said,
having 32 observations, while that is a significant improvement from the
number of observations in the previous model, is not enough to draw any
convincing conclusions. The residuals are more random than nonrandom,
but the overall trustworthiness of the regression coefficients cannot be
definitively stated.
Finally, when comparing the female tertiary coefficient value (0.7348)
to the p-value (0.0), it is clear that the female tertiary predictor variable is
statistically significant. This is due to the p-value being smaller than the
significance level of 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis that GDP per capita will
not be influenced by female tertiary can be rejected. Furthermore, because
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the coefficient value is approximately 0.7348, there does exist a positive
relationship between female tertiary and GDP per capita, and for every 1%
increase in the level of female tertiary enrollment, the GDP per capita
increases by about 0.7348%, assuming, of course, that the residual plot is
random.
Examining the extent to which the female tertiary variable affects GDP
per capita would be incomplete without comparing it to how the control
variables affect GDP per capita. Below is a table that provides the
coefficients, standard error, t-value, p-value, and 95% confidence intervals
for each control variable with respect to the dependent variable:

Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The only control variables that have a positive relationship with GDP
per capita (like the independent variable, female tertiary) are male
primary, male tertiary, life expectancy at birth, and exports (% of GDP). A
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strong positive relationship between life expectancy at birth and GDP per
capita makes sense intuitively, because if the population in Bangladesh
lives longer, more consumption and production will be take place, which
boosts GDP. While the increase in life expectancy at birth from 1960 to
2016 contributed to an increase in population size (which negatively
impacts GDP per capita), the growth in GDP per capita during this time
period was significantly higher than the growth in population size.19 This
suggests that the life expectancy at birth variable may have had a stronger
effect on GDP than population size, which further explains its robust
positive relationship with GDP per capita. Similarly, a positive relationship
between exports, as a percentage of GDP, and GDP per capita is logical, as
an increase in exports leads to an increase in GDP, which in turn translates
into a rise in the GDP per capita.

What is surprising to note is how the coefficients for both male
primary and male tertiary are positive, while the coefficient for female
primary is negative. From this finding, a few implications can be derived.
First, female primary education does not appear to contribute to GDP per
capita in Bangladesh.20 Second, both male primary education and male
tertiary education could have significant positive influences on GDP per
capita. Determining the degree to which these two variables affect GDP per
capita warrants further research with a richer sample size than this study
has access to. In addition, it is important to highlight that the p-values for
the male primary and male tertiary control variables (0.066 and

19

From 1960-2016, GDP per capita in Bangladesh increased approx. 15-fold whereas population

growth only increased approx. 3-fold. Consult Tables 2 and 4 in the Appendix.
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approximately 0.004 respectively) are greater than the p-value for female
tertiary (0), and likely have a weaker relationship to GDP per capita than
female tertiary education. From this it could be inferred with some
trepidation that future policy should prioritize developing female tertiary
education more than other levels of education.
Before any conclusions can be drawn from these results, some of the
paper’s limitations must be discussed. To begin, using GDP per capita as a
proxy for economic development in Bangladesh is a significant assumption
that is quite contentious. While some positive externalities can result for
the impoverished with a boost in GDP per capita, many of the underlying
root causes that construct poverty traps that are very difficult for the
extreme poor to get out of are not resolved. Other indicators such as the
Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index tend to
give a more precise picture of economic development by pinpointing
specific areas a country or region may be extraordinarily weak in. As
mentioned previously, one of the main challenges encountered in the
research was finding enough data for these holistic measures in order to
conduct statistically significant tests. Nevertheless, at the end of the
appendix21, two tables that track Bangladesh’s progress in terms of human
development from 1990-2015 and in multidimensional poverty in the years
2004, 2007, and 2011 were included. Interestingly, while Bangladesh’s HDI
has steadily improved in the past two decades, its HDI rankings with
respect to the rest of the world has decreased in recent years. Also, the
country has shown consistent progress in diminishing its MPI for a little less
20

It is important to note that there were only 24 observations for the female primary education

variable, and thus this implication should be refrained from guiding policy decisions.
21

Tables 5 and 6.
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than a decade. If more data became available for future research, it would
be interesting to see to the extent to which higher education in women
influences human development and multidimensional poverty.

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to assess the degree to which higher
education in women influences economic development in Bangladesh.
With respect to the first model, from the offset, it had high hopes for
finding a direct causal relationship between higher education in women
and the female labour force participation rate, given the promising findings
in the relevant literature. After performing an OLS regression test on the
most pertinent data available, the null hypothesis could not be rejected
and the research hypothesis that the Female Labour Force Participation
Rate will be altered by higher education in women could not be
convincingly supported. For future research, it is recommended that more
comprehensive data is gathered on the Female Labour Force Participation
Rate in women from the time period of 1950-2010 in order to perform a
more rigorous statistical analysis from which definitive conclusions can be
drawn.
With respect to the second model, the research hypothesis that GDP
per capita would be affected by higher education in women, which was
measured by the female tertiary education enrollment indicator, was to
some extent supported. The null hypothesis was satisfactorily rejected, the
residuals appeared to be random, and the R-squared value was an
impressive 0.9551. That being said, it must be noted that the study’s
sample size was still not quite large enough for any conclusions to be made
with confidence. Similar to the first model, it is recommended that future
87

Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country

research expands the data on female tertiary education levels. Only after
statistically robust analyses can serious policy recommendations be made.
However, the results from the control variables’ coefficients table of the
second model shows promise and indicates that placing more focus on
improving, developing, and accelerating tertiary female education may be
the best path forward.
Improving access to higher education for women in Bangladesh is
critical for empowering them to escape formidable poverty traps and live
more enriching lives. The positive externalities that would result from
increasing the female tertiary levels are significant and should be
prioritized. Higher education for women may be a vital ingredient in
catalyzing Bangladesh’s ascent towards becoming a middle-income
country. This is why it is essential that more scrupulous research in the
future be undertaken to study the relationship between higher education
in women and economic development in Bangladesh. Imagine the progress
the country could make if more girls were empowered like Afroza Khatun.
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Appendix
Table 1: Bangladesh Female vs. Male Gross Enrollment Ratio in Primary &
Secondary Education, and Enrollment Tertiary Education (per 100,000
inhabitants) 1970-2014

Source: Education Statistics, World Bank Databank.
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Table 2: Bangladesh GDP per capita, GDP per capita, PPP, and GDP per
capita growth rate, 1960-2016
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

GDP per capita
(current US$)
88.7
97.1
99.6
101.3
99.5
105.8
111.7
121.7
121.5
133.6
138.2
131.8
93.0
117.7
179.0
272.7
138.6
128.8
172.4
196.4
222.6
241.9
215.4
199.3
208.5
239.0
227.4
247.1
263.2
277.8
297.6
284.7
285.1
291.7
290.7
319.6
382.9
389.5
395.3
397.4
405.6
402.6
400.6

GDP per capita, PPP
(current int. $)
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
832.4
869.3
916.5
961.2
998.0
1048.2
1092
1136.4
1183.4
1232.4
1301.5
1372.4
1420.4

GDP per capita growth
rate (annual %)
3.1
2.5
-3.3
7.7
-1.5
-0.7
-5.1
6.0
-1.7
3.0
-7.4
-15.5
1.7
7.7
-6.0
3.2
0
4.1
1.9
-1.9
4.4
-0.6
1.1
2.0
0.6
1.4
1.0
-0.3
0.2
3.0
1.1
3.1
2.4
1.7
2.9
2.3
2.3
3.0
2.6
3.3
3.1
1.9

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank.

Table 3: Bangladesh GINI Index, 1983-2010
Year
1983
1985
1988
1991
1995
2000
2005
2010

Source:

GINI Index (annual)
25.9
26.9
28.9
27.6
32.9
33.4
33.2
32.1

Poverty

and

Equity

Database,
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World

Bank

Databank
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Table 4: Life Expectancy at Birth and Population, total in Bangladesh 19602016
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Life Expectancy at Birth (yrs)
45.83
46.46
47.08
47.69
48.25
48.68
48.89
48.83
48.53
48.05
47.52
47.14
47.03
47.29
47.93
48.87
49.98
51.10
52.08
52.88
53.48
53.92
54.29
54.68
55.10
55.58
56.11
56.66
57.23
57.81
58.41
59.04
59.71
60.41
61.13
61.87
62.61
63.34
64.04
64.70
65.33
65.90
66.45
66.97

Source: World Bank Databank.
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Population, total (in millions)
48.20
49.59
51.03
52.53
54.13
55.83
57.67
59.62
61.58
63.42
65.05
66.42
67.60
68.69
69.88
71.31
72.99
74.93
77.03
79.24
81.47
83.72
86.01
88.34
90.73
93.20
95.74
98.34
100.98
103.60
106.20
108.73
111.22
113.70
116.18
118.71
121.27
123.85
126.45
129.03
131.58
134.11
136.60
139.02
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Table 5: Bangladesh HDI and HDI Ranking, 1990-2015
Year
HDI
1990
0.386
1991
0.393
1992
0.400
1993
0.408
1994
0.415
1995
0.423
1996
0.432
1997
0.441
1998
0.450
1999
0.459
2000
0.468
2001
0.476
2002
0.484
2003
0.491
2004
0.499
2005
0.506
2006
0.513
2007
0.520
2008
0.523
2009
0.535
2010
0.545
2011
0.557
2012
0.565
2013
0.570
2014
0.575
2015
0.579
Source: Human Development Reports, UNDP.

HDI Ranking
122
121
119
119
119
120
120
118
116
114
126
127
128
127
127
133
136
136
134
136
143
141
143
142
142
139

Table 6: Bangladesh Multidimensional Poverty 2004, 2007, 2011
Year
2004
2007
2011

𝑴𝑷𝑰𝑻
0.364
0.306
0.245

𝑯𝑻 (Incidence)
67.1
59.1
49.6

𝑨𝑻 (Intensity)
54.3
51.8
49.3

Source: OPHI Country Briefing 2017, Bangladesh.
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𝑯𝑫
𝑻 (Destitute)
29.0
23.1
17.4
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Table 7: Bangladesh Exports, Remittances, & Export Growth 1960-2016
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Exports (% of GDP)
10.0
10.78
10.75
9.98
10.03
9.66
10.28
9.31
8.33
8.15
8.31
6.29
5.67
6.54
3.70
2.90
4.75
7.04
5.56
6.11
5.49
5.13
5.08
5.60
3.40
5.38
5.18
4.99
5.43
5.54
5.91
6.66
7.59
9.02
9.00
10.86
9.71
10.52
11.76
11.76
12.34
13.39
12.41
11.43

Remittances (% of GDP)
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
0.19
0.82
0.87
1.10
1.87
1.88
2.84
3.65
2.65
2.26
2.65
3.08
2.87
2.63
2.46
2.49
2.88
3.04
3.41
3.17
2.90
3.16
3.21
3.52
3.69
3.90
5.22
5.31

Source: World Bank Databank.
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Export Growth (%)
~
-11.5
20.8
4.83
3.74
-5.19
14.33
-11.77
4.00
4.60
10.48
-27.62
-22.89
85.75
-29.44
12.17
24.77
25.45
-7.67
16.5
0.14
-31.77
-4.46
9.24
-0.94
7.90
-1.15
1.90
10.68
8.90
17.79
-3.09
21.85
16.39
3.68
30.72
8.08
14.32
12.27
2.25
14.4
14.9
-0.13
-1.70
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FRAMING BIAS AND IDENTITY CHARACTERISTICS IN THE PORTRAYAL OF
TERRORISTS IN AMERCAN NEWS MEDIA
Saffeya Ahmed, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
A narrative of “Islamic terrorism” has risen globally and in the U.S. since the
increase of terrorist attacks following 9/11. With over 385 terrorism
charges in the U.S. since 2001, these violent acts have run rampant
throughout the nation. Media in the form of print/online news, broadcast,
radio, and podcasts plays a major role in the representation of terrorist
attacks to the general public. Of interest is to explore apparent trends in
media framing as news outlets cover terrorist attacks differently based on
the identity of the perpetrator. The framing of an individual based on his or
her identity, which is composed of race, religion, or political ideology, feeds
into creating a false narrative regarding these specific identity
characteristics. In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorists in the media
based on their identities, this study conducts a two‐pronged longitudinal
content analysis following the New York Times’ coverage of ten terrorist
attacks occurring in the U.S. post‐9/11. The study’s findings indicate that a
terrorist’s identity is significant in the framing of said individual; terrorists
who are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent are framed in a more
politicized and racialized manner than terrorists who are non‐Muslim
and/or of Anglo‐Saxon descent, who are framed in a more humanized
manner.

Introduction
Major news outlets have a significant role in shaping the political
reality for individuals. In the United States, news outlets have been part of
the force creating a fabricated connection between Muslims and terrorism,
specifically since 9/11. The false narrative of “Islamic terrorism” and
“Islamic extremism” running rampant in the U.S. has risen since the actions
of al‐Qaeda in 2001. Feeding into islamophobia, American news media
have failed to recognize the real perpetrators committing terrorist acts
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within the bounds of our country.
A news report from The Nation Institute’s Investigative Fund and The
Center for Investigative Reporting’s Reveal found the number of terrorist
attacks by right‐wing extremists in the U.S. (2008‐2016) almost doubled
compared to the amount carried out by extremists associated with Islam1.
As an influential force, news media should provide a voice for those who
would otherwise be silenced. In the case of Muslim and foreign‐born
communities, several major news outlets have done the opposite by
spreading a rhetoric rooted in hate. Additionally, American news outlets
skew the image of the Muslim and immigrant persona by failing to amplify
the voices and concerns of these communities. Members of these
communities should be given ample opportunities to speak for and about
themselves in order to achieve accurate representation, rather than leaving
the images presented by misguided news commentary to serve as the main
source of representation.
Since news media have heavy influence over their readerships’
perceptions of certain concepts, people, and events, this study seeks to
explore the bias in the portrayal of terrorists on the basis of identity
characteristics present in news media post‐9/11. For this study, major news
outlets and media sources are narrowed down to print news media
specifically; major is defined by the newspaper’s circulation level. Previous
research has not tackled the question of portrayal based on identity
characteristics using the comparison of multiple attacks. This study seeks to
analyze the portrayal of terrorists in print news media based on identity

1

Ruiz‐Grossman, S. (2017, 23 June). Most of America’s Terrorists are White, and Not Muslim. The
Huffington Post.
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characteristics such as race, religion, and political ideology.
Literature Review: Media Framing, Agenda‐Setting, and Priming
Goffman’s frame analysis explains the way that individuals organize
and order their most salient personal events and experiences. Individuals
structure ideas to understand their underlying concepts, guiding future
action.
...definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of
organization which govern events, and our subjective involvement in
them;
frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am
able to identify... (Goffman, 1974)
A key component in creating said “frames” is information filtering, a tactic
used by media outlets to influence audiences. The information fed to the
general public is actively consumed and enforced, therefore allowing media
sources to have enormous power in controlling what people know and
what conclusions they are able to draw from the information provided.
When these “frames” address both the diagnosis and prognosis of a
problem, as well as an attempted resolution to said problem, they are
called collection actions, a type of framing proposed by Snow and Benford
following Goffman (1988).
In terms of media influence, framing goes hand‐in‐hand with agenda‐
setting theory, defined as the ability of mass media to ultimately define the
salience of specific events, experiences, and topics for its audiences by the
way it organizes its public agenda. McCombs and Shaw claim the way news
is chosen and displayed plays an important part in shaping individuals’
political reality (1972). Through repetition of certain ideas, use of specific
language, and implementation of specific framing techniques, media
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outlets are able to influence a readership’s beliefs about certain groups,
concepts, and topics. News outlets most easily do so by constant
association of ideas and/or people previously unassociated by readers. The
consistent

association

of

two

ideas

with

no

pre‐existing

correlational/causal relationship, called priming, is a key component in
both agenda‐setting and framing. Priming is the association of specific
concepts together due to constant dual exposure. Grounded in cognitive
psychology and rooted specifically within conditioning concepts, media
priming is defined by how the human memory stores an idea or concept
because of its previous associations. These associations are often
manipulated by news media through frames used to portray individuals,
experiences, and events (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2012).
In the case of American media coverage of terrorist attacks occurring
globally, priming plays a part in readership association between the
concepts of terrorism and extremism with Islam, Muslims, and darker‐
skinned or foreign‐born individuals. Combining priming and information
filtering, news editors decide what will and will not be included in news
articles, in turn determining what associations will be formed between
concepts for their readerships (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2012;
Goffman, 1974). In a framing bias study, Robert Entman illustrated the link
between agenda‐setting, priming, and framing as tools of power for media
outlets. Directly related to the phenomena of bias and news slant, each of
these concepts affect how audiences perceive messages due to both the
selection of information provided as well as how it is presented (Entman,
2007).
Critical Race Theory
Critical Race Theory plays a significant role in the framing of terrorists
99

Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News Media

through American news media, providing an explanation as to how social
institutions, including news outlets, instigate microaggressions as a tool of
oppressing multicultural and minority groups (Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin, &
Snyder, 2012). Developed by a group of scholars in the 1970s, critical race
theory serves to provide a lens of ethnicity, prejudice, and structural
inequity through which concepts regarding race and class can be examined
(Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin, & Snyder, 2012). In the case of media framing,
framing components – specifically word choice and use of stereotypical
language – if used strategically, have the power to oppress minority groups
existent within a society. In news media, neutral reporting can be plagued
by the use of harsh verbs and descriptors as well as small remarks playing
on existent stereotypes. While they might be potentially unnoticeable in
singular instances, these microaggressions feed into visualizing a specific
persona behind certain identity characteristics (Jeffries, D. & Jeffries, R.,
2017).
Relevant Literature
A handful of studies have considered the variance in framing of
terrorist attacks and their respective perpetrators in Western media due to
the persona of the perpetrator. Most, however, have been case studies
examining a specific attack and the news coverage following it. Several
previous studies examined the coverage of the terrorist attack by Anders
Breivik in Norway, 2011. Studies by Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) and
Falheimer and Olsson (2015) exposed how “lone‐wolf” terrorists need to be
seen as acting from rhetoric embedded in a much larger social movement.
The categorization of a terrorist as a “lone‐wolf” is detrimental in
preventing similar acts in the future because the “lone‐wolf” narrative
makes the perpetrator an outlier; the odd one out of many (Berntzen &
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Sandberg, 2014). If an actor is considered the odd one out of many, an
entire group’s (i.e. Anglo‐Saxon, non‐Muslim) potential to commit terrorist
acts is swept under the rug as simply “out of the ordinary.” Berntzen and
Sandberg’s study did not hone in on any specific news outlet or gather data
specifically from certain articles published by a singular outlet. Instead,
their case study focused only on Breivik’s attack and provided a structure
as to how collective action framing played a part in the news coverage of
his attack. Falkheimer and Olsson focused on Norwegian news media,
conducting content analysis on 924 news articles from two major
Norwegian newspapers in the two weeks following Breivik’s attacks (2015).
The study concluded the framing utilized to depict Breivik resulted in the
depoliticized portrayal of Breivik and his attacks, portraying him as a sole –
and potentially mentally unstable– actor (Falheimer & Olsson, 2015).
Previous studies related to inaccurate media representation addressed
the issue of skewed framing and portrayal in the U.S. and Canada of
terrorism through broadcast coverage, a medium form where framing,
priming, and agenda‐setting play a major role (Wittebol, 1992). Information
filtering, for individuals, can often times be attributed to the content on
their nightly news channels. The capacity of conducting a study like
Wittebol’s using broadcast sources is far more complex as more factors
play into portrayal of certain individuals over others – amount of screen‐
time, use of mugshots, length of clips played/at what time,
interviews/soundbites used, etc.
In this paper, a comparative procedure similar to that used by
Schildkraut and Muschert in their comparison of the effects of media
salience in the framing of mass murders in schools (2013) is used. Thus far,
there has been limited literature providing solid comparisons on the topic
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of terrorist portrayal and identity characteristics, however Schildkraut and
Muschert compare print news coverage of two major mass school
shootings. In “Media Salience and the Framing of Mass Murder in Schools:
A Comparison of the Columbine and Sandy Hook Massacres,” Schildkraut
and Muschert address the concept of “issue‐attention cycle.” Proposed by
Anthony Downs, “issue‐attention cycle” explains the process by which
events make their way into the news, gain salience from readership and/or
viewers, and are then replaced by new events and stories (1972). “Issue‐
attention cycle” directly relates to agenda‐setting, and is relevant for this
study in terms of assessing headline content as headlines may be more or
less politicized or racialized due to their salience at the current time in the
current media. The experimental design for this study will be grounded in
running content analysis similar to those run by Falkheimer and Olsson. A
comparative procedure similar to that of Schildkraut and Muschert will be
implemented.
Methods
To address a question not fully answered by previous associated
literature, this study proposes the question: To what extent do major news
outlets in the U.S. construe the portrayal of terrorists based on the identity
of the perpetrator of the attack post‐9/11? Previous research addressed
the question of skewed media framing for specific attacks, yet failed to
compare framing between attacks on the basis of identity characteristics:
in this case, specifically race and religion. Of interest is to explore and
compare the differences in levels of politicization and racialization of a
perpetrator’s media framing as per the ethnicity and/or religious affiliation
of the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Analyzing the question through the
lens of print media, specifically The New York Times, is relevant to the
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perception of the concept of terrorism as a whole to the newspaper’s
readership. The lens through which news media frame perpetrators of
terrorist attacks based on identity characteristics influences the way the
American public views these identities. Focusing on The New York Times for
this study is pertinent due to its influence on the American population as
the second most highly circulated print/online newspaper in the nation.2
Additionally, as a paper with a left‐leaning perspective, it is expected that
The New York Times would be less likely to frame perpetrators based on
their religious or racial backgrounds than that of a right‐leaning
counterpart.3
In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorist in the media on the basis
of identity, a qualitative longitudinal content analysis is conducted on The
New York Times’ immediate coverage of attacks federally labeled “acts of
terrorism” post‐9/11. Analyzing a total of ten attacks from 2001‐present,
this study surveys the framing of the articles and their respective headlines
published by The New York Times in the 15‐day period following the attack,
including the day of the attack. The content analyses are run to test the
hypothesis that if a perpetrator of a terror attack is Muslim and/or of non‐
Anglo‐Saxon descent, the framing of the perpetrator will be more
politicized and racialized than if the perpetrator is non‐Muslim and/or of
Anglo‐Saxon descent.
A total of 107 articles4 and their respective headlines are analyzed and
rated using a five‐point Likert Scale measure to survey the articles’ and

2

State of the News Media 2016. (2016). Pew Research Center.

3

Jutel, O. (2016). The liberal field of journalism and the political—The New York Times, Fox News, and
the Tea Party. Journalism: Theory, Practice, and Criticism 17(8), 1129‐45.
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headlines’ racial and political content in regards to the framing of the
perpetrators of said attacks.5 The five points of the scale include: positive,
neutral‐positive, neutral, neutral‐negative, and negative.6 The basis for
rating lies in specific wording, tone, article structure, use of stereotypical
language, re‐emphasis of key ideas and identity characteristics through
repetition, and use of visuals. Attacks are chosen using a purposive and
convenience sampling method on the basis of similarities in attack
methodology, weaponry, and number of fatalities/casualties.7 All attacks
4
All articles surveyed are from the News section of The New York Times. Articles cross‐published on the
Times’ website are not surveyed. Similarly, articles from the Opinion, Reader Center, and other Times
sections are not surveyed.
5
The five‐point Likert Scale utilized is based off of that used by Perry in a research study following The
New York Times’ coverage of pre‐primary Black presidential candidates. Perry, R. (2010). First
Impressions, “American’s Paper” and Pre‐Primary Black Presidential Candidates: The New York Times
Coverage of Rev. Jesse Jackson (1983), Rev. Al Sharpton (2003), and Sen. Barack Obama (2007)
Campaign Announcements and Initial Days. Ethnic Studies Review, 33(2), 83‐108.
6
To analyze article and headline content, a five‐point Likert Scale was created where positive, neutral‐
positive, neutral, neutral‐negative, and negative were assigned to each article and its respective
headline chosen for the study based on the content coded in each. Positive articles frame the attack’s
perpetrator in a depoliticized manner without stereotypical language, failing to mention or focus on
race, religion, political ideology, and/or extremist affiliation. Further than purely depoliticized, positive
articles humanize the perpetrator, focusing on details about the perpetrator’s personal life and quality
characteristics. These articles also use passive verbs and nouns to characterize the attacker and his/her
actions. Positive articles fail to categorize the attack and its respective perpetrator as an act of terrorism
and terrorist, respectively. If a visual is used, it is a personal photograph, rather than a mugshot.
Neutral‐ positive articles depoliticize the image of the perpetrator by focusing more on the attack
victims. These articles stray away from stereotypical language and use passive verbs and nouns to
characterize the attacker and his/her actions. Neutral‐positive articles do not necessarily humanize the
perpetrator, however do not focus/reemphasize the perpetrator’s race, religion, political ideology,
and/or extremist affiliation as is relevant. Neutral articles do not attach stereotypical language to the
identity characteristics mentioned and a mugshot, if any photo, is used. Neutral verbs and nouns are
used to characterize the attacker and his/her actions. Neutral‐negative articles frame the perpetrator in
a more politicized and racialized manner than the previous three. These articles focus on and stress the
race, religion, political ideology, and extremist affiliation of the perpetrator. Neutral‐negative articles
may use slight stereotypical language in characterizing the perpetrator. These articles may categorize
the attack and its respective perpetrator as terrorism & terrorist, respectively. A mug shot is typically
used, and the articles focuses on the attacker’s motive and method of attack rather than the attacker’s
personal life or the attack victims. Negative articles frame the perpetrator in a highly politicized and
racialized manner with a heavy emphasis and focus on race, religion, political ideology, and/or potential
extremist affiliations/tendencies. The content repeatedly uses politically‐ fueled words like “terrorism”,
“terrorist”, “extremist”, and uses harsher verbs than the previous ratings. Negative articles use a heavy
amount of stereotypical language and fail to create any sort of humanized identity behind the
perpetrator. Negative articles also see use of a mugshot to visualize the perpetrator.
7
The attacks analyzed include: 2002 Los Angeles International Airport shooting, Knoxville Unitarian
Universalist church shooting (2008), Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting (2012), 2014 Pennsylvania State
Police barracks attack, 2014 Las Vegas shootings, 2014 Queens hatchet attack, 2015 Chattanooga
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chosen to survey fall within the post‐9/11 time period and are federally
labelled “acts of terrorism” by the F.B.I. or associated authorities.8 The
sample of ten attacks is split up into two groups—Group [A] and Group [B]
for comparative analysis purposes.9
Obstacles for the current experimental methodology exist within the
time limitation. This limit specifically leads to a smaller sample size, smaller
time frame of analysis, and ability to survey content from only one form of
news media (i.e. print) and one specific outlet (the New York Times). A
separate obstacle exists in the heavy influence of researcher’s bias as the
researcher surveys each article and respective headline. The articles and
headlines are further influenced by being rated on a Likert scale created by
the researcher. The results are most likely skewed slightly due to the data
collection method being based in human judgement/choice.

shootings, Ohio State University attack (2016), Unite the Right rally (2017), and 2017 Lower Manhattan
attack.
8

Articles selected are all identified as “acts of terror” by the F.B.I. or associated authorities. The attacks
not federally labeled as terrorism or fail to charge the perpetrator with terrorism include: the Knoxville
Unitarian Universalist church shooting (2008) and the vehicular attack at the 2017 United the Right
rally. The perpetrator of the vehicular attack was formally charged with second‐degree murder and
other crimes. Despite these charges, the attack was formally denounced as “domestic terrorism” by the
current U.S. Attorney General and Justice Department (Myre, G. (2017). Why the Government Can’t
Bring Terrorism Charges in Charlottesville. National Public Radio.) The Knoxville Unitarian Universalist
church shooting falls directly under the federal definition of terrorism. Similarly, the perpetrator’s letter
of motive found after the attack is comparable to that of the manifesto of Anders Breivik, found post‐
terror attacks in Norway, 2011 (Berntzen L. E. & Sandberg, S. (2014). The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf
Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti‐Islamic Social Movement. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 26, 759‐79.)
9
Attacks are split up on the basis of the religious affiliation (if known) and ethnicity of the respective
perpetrator for comparative analysis purposes. Group [A] is composed of attacks committed by
perpetrators who are non‐Muslim and/or of Anglo‐Saxon descent. [A] includes: Knoxville Unitarian
Universalist church shooting, Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting, 2014 Pennsylvania State Police barracks
attack, 2014 Las Vegas shootings, and United the Right rally. Group [B] is composed of attacks
committed by perpetrators who are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent. [B] includes: 2002 Los
Angeles International Airport shooting, 2014 Queens hatchet attack, 2015 Chattanooga shootings, Ohio
State University attack, and 2017 Lower Manhattan attack.
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Data Results
In running content analysis on each article and respective headline,
ratings are applied with a focus on word choice – specifically verb and
descriptor tone, use of stereotypical language, repetition, and use of
visuals. In reporting terrorist attacks, print news outlets typically release
articles to cover the following: a ‘breaking news’ story with the run‐down
of the attack including who was involved, attack methodology, number
killed/injured, etc.; anywhere from one to three profile stories on the
perpetrator, some assessing attack motive, others focusing on personal life;
a profile story on the victims and/or victim community; and updates by the
F.B.I. and/or political officials later on in the fifteen days following the
attack with information about the investigation.
New York Times Coverage of non‐Muslim/Anglo‐Saxon Perpetrators: Group [A]

Of the five attacks sampled for Group [A], 55 articles and headlines
were analyzed. In analysis, a trend of humanizing and neutral language, use
of visuals aside from a mugshot, and emphasis on personal characteristics
is apparent. In the first few articles released following an attack, several of
the articles left identity characteristics out when describing the
perpetrator, and often times did not mention a name. Typical descriptors
included the presumed age and gender of the perpetrator; i.e. “a 41‐year
old man,” “an Ohio man,” “a 31‐year old man,” etc. Race and religion is
typically not mentioned for the Anglo‐Saxon perpetrators; if either
characteristic is, they are not repeated and emphasized to the extent that
Group [B] sees. Profile articles for Group [A] perpetrators are where most
of the positive ratings arise. In journalism, profile stories are a type of
feature story which focus on a specific person. In the case of these
perpetrator profiles, reporters focus on different aspects of these
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individuals’ lives than would be expected in visualizing a terrorist. The
profile stories contained the most humanizing descriptors and details about
the terrorists to make them seem like everyday people.
In framing terrorist Wade M. Page, responsible for the Wisconsin Sikh
temple shooting in 2012, the repeated character descriptors throughout
articles were “Army veteran” and “rock singer” – misleading descriptors
when depicting the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Additionally, personal
details unaffiliated with the attack or motive of the attacker at all were
largely included in Group [A] articles.
Peter Hoyt, 53, a neighbor of Mr. Page’s in Cudahy who often
stopped to chat with him during his morning walks, said he was
“stunned” that the man he had known could have done something
so violent. Mr. Page, he said, told him that he had broken up with a
girlfriend in early June.
In an article addressing Page’s ties to the white supremacist movement,
descriptions about his music career became the central ideas rather than
his extremist affiliations.
Mr. Page’s life as a white power musician playing violence‐inciting
songs was surprisingly open. He did interviews, posted photos on
MySpace pages (one shows him playing guitar with a noose in the
background), performed at festivals and even spoke candidly about
his beliefs with an academic researching the movement.
When describing Page’s affiliations with the white supremacist movement,
largely neutral language (i.e. “his beliefs,” “the movement,” etc.) and
sometimes positive language (i.e. “white power,” insinuating a form of
personal empowerment behind the movement) is largely used, gaining
Page’s articles positive ratings.
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Similarly, several articles received neutral‐positive ratings on the basis
of the articles’ inability to describe the perpetrator as a “terrorist” directly,
using more neutral descriptors in place. Neutral terms such as “suspect,”
“gunman,” “survivalist,” “driver,” and “man” were chosen as descriptors
for the perpetrators rather than more politically‐fueled words such as
“terrorist” or “extremist.” These passive nouns made a hefty appearance in
headline content, specifically (mentioned below).
Articles that were not profile stories which used these types of
descriptors automatically became neutral in nature, and ended up being
assigned neutral‐positive or neutral‐negative based on other framing
details. For example, in the case of James Alex Fields, perpetrator of the
vehicular attack at the Unite the Right rally in 2017, word choice and
humanizing language played a part in determining the article’s rating. The
article’s use of humanizing descriptors and inability to mention that the
case was being investigated as an act of domestic terrorism, mentioning
him only as a “driver,” creates a less politically and racially fueled frame.
Describing him as “a very bright kid,” “quiet teenager,” and a “very quiet
little boy,” the article’s focus on Fields’ childhood creates an image of a
young man whose actions are completely out‐of‐line with what would be
expected. The framing implemented in Fields’ case feeds into the “lone‐
wolf” rhetoric (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014), pushing the fact that despite
ties to right‐wing extremist groups, Fields was a lone actor – disassociated
from a larger movement from any source.
Group [A]’s headlines consisted of a great deal of neutral language –
often written in passive voice – leading to positive and neutral ratings. A
trend in headline content is the typical use of neutral terms in place of
“terrorist” or “extremist” or “terror attack”—typically words like “suspect,”
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“man,” or “driver” were used instead. In several articles, the perpetrator is
not mentioned with a neutral term at all; rather he/she is completely
removed and disassociated from the headline. Headlines which did so
received positive or n/a ratings, depending on the rest of the framing of the
headline.
New York Times Coverage of Muslim/non‐Anglo‐Saxon Perpetrators: Group [B]

In comparison, the five attacks sampled for Group [B] had 52 articles
and headlines analyzed. Key trends in analysis formed in the use of
stereotypical language, harsh descriptors, and the repetition and emphasis
on race and religion. Stereotypical language played an influential role in
Group [B]’s ratings. Specific wording and phrases included within articles
and headlines contributing to existing stereotypes about the perpetrator’s
religion and/or ethnic background were generally rated neutral‐negative if
the amount of stereotypical language was generous; if it was superfluous
and combined with harsh language and politicized/racialized descriptors,
the rating dropped down to negative. Opposing the humanizing language
and descriptors generally characterizing most of Group [A]’s profile stories,
Group [B] profile stories emphasized the perpetrator’s roots outside of the
U.S., and their background in foreign countries– feeding into the
stereotype that terrorists are a foreign‐born agent. In the case of the 2015
Chattanooga shootings, articles regarding perpetrator Mohammod Youssuf
Abdulazeez saw a fair share of stereotypical language.
On Friday, Ossama Bahloul, the imam of the Islamic Center of
Murfreesboro, said the attack in Chattanooga ‘was shocking to
everyone’ because Mr. Abdulazeez seemed so American, having
grown up and gone to school in Tennessee.
The inclusion of the information above feeds into a stereotype that the
109

Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News Media

terrorist attack committed by Abdulazeez are acts “Americans” are
incapable of committing. The association between foreign‐born bodies and
terrorism is primed for a medium’s readership through descriptors like
these. This article used stronger verbs and wrote in an active voice rather
than passive (which several of Group [A]’s articles were written as), using
verbs like “dominated,” “pummeling,” “killed” and “slaughter.” The use of
hard verbs and heavy stereotypical language resulted in several of the
articles for the 2015 Chattanooga shootings receiving negative and neutral‐
negative ratings. Any articles in which the words “terrorist,” “terrorism,”
“extremist” or “extremism” were used heavily or superfluously received
negative ratings due to how politically‐charged each of those words are;
contributing to the association of certain groups with these politically
charged words.
The negative rating when these politically‐charged words are used
superfluously was specifically evident in Group [B]’s headlines analysis.
Compared to Group [A] headlines, which leaned towards neutral nominal
descriptors for the perpetrators, Group [B] headlines saw “terrorist,”
“terror attack,” or “extremist” mentioned in a hefty number of headlines –
therefore receiving negative ratings. A headline’s word choice plays a large
role in the framing of the article as a whole (Jutel, 2016): the way the
article is introduced by its title sets the stage for how the reader will
approach the article’s content itself (Jutel, 2016). Similarly, headlines serve
as clickbait. The more striking the wording used, the more circulated an
article becomes. The more striking the headline is worded, the more salient
it seems to a reader (Schildkraut & Muschert,2015). Salience leads to the
emphasis of the content in the article, which is ultimately more politicized
and racialized in nature for Group [B].
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Findings & Implications
Following the analysis and rating of 107 articles and respective
headlines10, the results of the attacks committed by perpetrators of Muslim
and/or non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent and those of Anglo‐Saxon descent and/or
other religious affiliations are compared. The results are as follows:

11

A total of 55 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [A], while a
total of 52 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [B]. A majority of
Group [A]’s articles rated either neutral‐ positive (27%) or neutral (29%). A
majority of Group [B]’s articles rated either negative (40%) or neutral‐
10

Appendix available upon request

11

Articles are left unlabeled (n/a) if the content is relevant coverage of the attack, however does not

mention/is not focused on the perpetrator of the attack. Examples include victim & victim community
profiles, released statements by law enforcement officials and political authorities, and updates at the
attack site. Headlines are also left unlabeled (n/a) if the headline fails to include any language regarding
the perpetrator. All articles labeled n/a received headline ratings of the same.
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negative (27%). For headline content, a majority of Group [A]’s article
headlines rated either positive (29%) or neutral (25%); while a majority of
Group [B]’s article headlines rated either negative (40%) or neutral (35%).
The results indicate a trend consistent with the proposed idea that
negative framing is associated with individuals who are Muslim and
typically foreign‐born. With forty percent negative ratings for attacks
perpetrated by such individuals, the Times’ immediate framing leaned very
politicized and racialized. Compared to the twenty‐nine and twenty‐seven
percent neutral and neutral‐positive article ratings, respectively, and
twenty‐nine percent positive headline ratings for perpetrators of the
opposite group, there is a clear difference in reporting techniques and
information filtering used depending on identity characteristics.
Consistent with the originally‐proposed hypothesis, results shift from
relatively neutral article content to highly negative content as the
perpetrator’s identity shifts. Similarly, a shift from highly positive headlines
to highly negative headlines occurs with the same identity shift. An
anticipated result of majority positive ratings for Group [A] was disproved
in article content; only 6 articles, or eleven percent, received positive
ratings. Notable in rating is that the only type of articles that received
positive ratings were profile articles on the perpetrators; for both groups.
Additionally notable is that articles which received negative ratings
received headline ratings of the same. The anticipated result of majority
positive ratings for Group [A] was proven in headline analysis with 16
articles, or twenty‐nine percent, rated positive. Group [A] sees a far larger
share of neutral reporting across both analyses in comparison to Group
[B]—however, Group [B] saw a substantial amount of neutral headlines,
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with 18 articles, or thirty‐five percent.12
The implications of research lie in the necessity of eradicating the bias
in reporting on foreign‐born and Muslim bodies—the skewed portrayal of
non‐Muslim and Anglo‐Saxon attackers has left focus off of the right‐wing
extremists. The highly politicized and racialized content features
throughout the reports regarding attacks by Muslims and/or foreign‐born
individuals has fed into the stereotype that extremists are only associated
with Islam. Through the use of priming and agenda‐setting, media outlets
have provided a false association of Muslims and/or individuals of non‐
Anglo‐Saxon descent, whether terrorists or not, with the concepts of
terrorism and extremism. Meanwhile, the alternate group has become
associated with the “lone‐wolf” rhetoric: he/she is one actor of a group
who could never come to represent the group as a whole. News outlets
should strive to neutrally report on every event as it occurs, providing its
readership with the most accurate, impartial information as possible. While
all judgement could not possibly be extracted, the use of specific verbs,
descriptors, stereotypical language, and visuals changes the entire frame
personifying an individual. Expansions of this study could provide more
specific evidence as to why certain attacks receive slanted coverage
compared to others.
This study provides a generous amount of room to be expanded upon.
Confounding variables for this study may lie in the lack of access to
information by reporters assigned stories, other pressing events and news
12
Group [B] result percentages for headline content analyses are of greater value than those of Group
[A] due to the amount of unlabeled (n/a) headlines that Group [A] received. With sixteen unlabeled
articles, Group [A] percentages are skewed, as 29% of the headlines were not labeled. Rather than
comparing the literal values of the percentages obtained, categories which received the highest number
of ratings are compared within each group.
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stories occurring alongside the attack, and potentially the communities
affected by the attack. Eliminating and/or accounting for these in a study
able to focus solely on the independent and dependent variable at hand
would be most preferred and reliable. Expansions of the research would be
the study conducted without its main two obstacles: time limitations and
judgement bias. This study conducted without a time limitation would
provide the ability to sample a larger number of attacks, potentially more
representative of different ethnic and religious groups, as well as provide
the ability to survey articles from a longer time period post‐attack. Lifting
time restrictions could also provide the opportunity to survey article and
headline content through a different news outlet, or multiple outlets and
compile data from all.
While it is not physically possible to eliminate any and all judgement
bias when using a man‐made scale and allowing human judgement to
analyze content, a way to potentially improve the study would be to allow
multiple individuals to analyze and provide ratings, and/or provide a strict
measurement scale based solely on specific word choices, number of
words, and use of visuals (measurements that can be strictly enumerated
or answered yes or no) in order to avoid the use of excessive judgement in
rating. Intriguing for further research within the topic’s bounds would be
exploring the correlation between the identity characteristics of reporters
with the rating portrayal of attackers. It would also be interesting to survey
solely profile articles to see if the trend noticed in this study does
necessarily exist outside of the scope of this project.
Conclusion
The findings of this study are consistent with the original hypothesis
that if the perpetrator of a terrorist attack is Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐
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Saxon descent, the media framing of the perpetrator will be more
politicized and racialized than if the perpetrator is not Muslim and/or is of
Anglo‐Saxon descent. As a highly‐circulated newspaper with a huge
readership, The New York Times is influential in the priming of readers
through the choice of framing used. After examining the news coverage in
the fifteen days following ten separate terrorist attacks which occurred in
the U.S. post‐9/11, it is clear there is a difference between the framing
techniques The New York Times uses to cover perpetrators of one
racial/religious background in comparison to another. The data results
show that more politicized and racialized content in the form of
stereotypical language, active verbs, and fueled descriptors/visuals appear
in articles and headlines covering attacks perpetrated by individuals who
are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent. The opposite is found for
individuals who are non‐Muslim and/or of Anglo‐Saxon descent, where
articles and headlines are flooded with humanizing vocabulary, neutral
descriptors, passive verbs, and positive images. News media hold a great
deal of power in visualizing a political reality for their readerships. The
elimination of news slant in the portrayal of terrorist attacks is particularly
necessary for the mobilization and success of marginalized ethnic and
religious groups who get the runt end in the current reporting style.
Language, visuals, tone, and other content must be chosen precisely so as
to portray individuals in the correct light as is deemed necessary, and to
carry out the true purpose of the media – to impartially inform and
educate.
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THE “DRONE MEMO” AND THE TARGETED KILLING OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI
Kevin Breiner, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
In 2011, the Obama administration employed a lethal drone strike against
Anwar al-Aulaqi, both a US citizen and known terrorist. The “drone memo,”
authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, seeks to
justify this drone strike as an appropriate use of wartime power by the
Commander-in-Chief. In doing so, the memo distorts the scope of
presidential authority granted by the Constitution and Congress, and
ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees.
To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal
government, judicial review must be made available to the targets of
overwhelming executive power.
Introduction
While recent presidential administrations have garnered much
criticism for their use of unmanned drones as a means of waging the global
war on terror, perhaps no single incident has become so infamous as the
targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi. In addition to being a senior member of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with verifiable links to known
terrorist plots, al-Aulaqi was a US citizen. The Obama administration,
considering him an imminent threat to national security, targeted al-Aulaqi
in a lethal drone strike in 2011. His death reignited a debate with roots in
the nation’s founding, concerning both the scope of presidential power and
the extent to which the Constitution protects civil liberties in extraordinary
times. The Obama administration, in response to congressional pressure
and litigation brought by the ACLU, released its legal rationale for the strike
in the “drone memo,” a document which justifies the targeting as an
appropriate exercise of wartime power by the Commander in Chief. In
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doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by
the Constitution and Congress and ignores fundamental elements of
Constitutional due process guarantees.

The President in Foreign Affairs
Although the framers of the Constitution envisioned a government in
which most power flowed from the legislature, they nonetheless endowed
the chief executive with a great degree of independence and autonomy in
the realm of foreign affairs (O’Brien, 2017). Both Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison acknowledged in The Federalist Papers that, in preserving
national security, the president is not strictly limited to his or her
enumerated Constitutional powers (O’Brien, 2017). Indeed, it is common
practice for Congress, the Supreme Court, and the public to defer to the
president in making decisions that involve international diplomacy or
foreign threats (O’Brien, 2017).
Illustrative of this trend, the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in US v.
Curtiss-Wright established that Congress did not unconstitutionally
delegate its power by authorizing the president to impose an arms
embargo on Paraguay and Bolivia (1936). The outcome of the case rested
largely on the fact that the federal government was acting in the foreign,
rather than domestic, realm (Curtiss-Wright, 1936). As the executive
branch is the only unified branch of government, the Court determined
that the framers intended it to act as the nation’s sole representative in the
context of international affairs (Curtiss-Wright, 1936). In consideration of
this mindset, the majority concluded that it is appropriate for Congress to
defer to the president concerning matters of national security (CurtissWright, 1936). This decision set an important precedent supporting the
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dominance of executive authority, whenever it is exercised to pursue
foreign policy interests (Curtiss-Wright, 1936).
Further cementing the chief executive’s central role in the conduct of
international relations, the Court, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, ruled that
the president acted appropriately in ordering the termination of all US
court proceedings against the Iranian government, as a means of pursuing
a hostage agreement (1981). After determining that the president had
neither acted with nor against the explicit will of the Constitution or
Congress, the majority turned to the specific facts of the case and
subsequently decided that the president had acted upon an implied grant
of power found in existing law (Dames and Moore, 1981)1. In justifying this
use of executive authority, the Court again upheld the principle that, unless
specifically constrained, the president has substantial discretion in
managing the nation’s relationship with the global community (Dames and
Moore, 1981).
Beyond these traditional exercises of diplomacy, however, one must
also understand presidential power in the context of war. Although the
Constitution divides the power to wage war between the executive and
legislative branches, the president has nonetheless ordered troops abroad
on numerous occasions without explicit Congressional approval (O’Brien,
2017). The Court validates this practice in The Prize Cases, in which it
1

In this case, President Carter acted under the authority of the

International Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). While Dames & Moore noted
that this act did not explicitly authorize the president to suspend court
claims against another nation, the Court concluded that such an action was
consistent with Congress’ intent in passing IEEPA (O’Brien, p.235-236,
2017).
120

Kevin Breiner

determined that President Lincoln had the authority to enact a blockade on
the ports of rebellious Southern states, even in the absence of a
Congressional declaration of war (1863). Although the Constitution
specifically delegates the power to declare war to the legislative body, the
majority held that the existence of a “state of war,” coupled with implied
Congressional approval2, justified extraordinary measures deemed
appropriate by the president (Prize Cases, 1863).

Presidential War Powers Curbed by Due Process Guarantees
However extensive presidential power may be in conducting war or
other foreign policy activities, the Court has acknowledged that such power
still must bend to accommodate certain Constitutional protections
(O’Brien, 2017). Specifically, the conflict between military necessity and
due process rights has been the subject of numerous definitive cases
(O’Brien, 2017). Historically, the Court has ruled that although war may
dictate a need for expanded presidential power, it does not justify the
elimination of a basic due process framework (O’Brien, 2017).
The Court expresses its willingness to check the president’s wartime
power in Ex Parte Milligan, where it notes that a state of war does not
allow for the circumvention of all traditional due process rights (1866). In
this civil war case, the executive branch used the laws of war to justify the
sentencing of Milligan, a suspected traitor to the Union, by military
commission (Ex Parte Milligan, 1866). As Indiana, the state in which
2

The Court used two statutes, passed in 1795 and 1807, to decide that

Lincoln was acting with Congress’ approval (O’Brien, 2017). These laws
allowed the president to use the military to protect against foreign invasion
and suppress rebellions (O’Brien, p. 288-289, 2017).
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Milligan was apprehended, was not in rebellion against the Union, and as
the federal civil courts remained open, the Court determined that the state
of national emergency was not so great as to warrant the application of
martial law (Ex Parte Milligan, 1866). Even further, the president did not
have the authority to replace civil courts with his own military tribunal in
the absence of Congressional authorization (Tribe & Katyal, p. 1292-1293,
2002).
Perhaps more relevant to present-day concerns, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
examines due process rights as applied to the global war on terror (2004).
In this case, the majority determined that Hamdi, a US citizen detained by
government authorities based on his Taliban connections, was entitled to
some means of challenging his confinement (Hamdi, 2004). In its reasoning,
the Court employed Mathews v. Eldridge, which determined that the
extent of due process given is a product of balancing the interests of the
accused against the interests and burdens of the government (1976). This
balance, in light of the specific case facts, demanded that Hamdi be given
some measure of protection (Hamdi, 2004). In determining the extent of
such protection, the majority turned to Cleveland v. Loudermill (1985),
which stated that one must at least be provided with information
pertaining to the basis of his detention and an opportunity to challenge
those accusations before an impartial audience (Hamdi, 2004).
Tangentially related, the case of Boumediene v. Bush considers
whether or not suspected terrorists held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have
Constitutional habeas corpus rights (2008). While the government claimed
that such rights were not applicable to those held outside of the United
States, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion made the pointed observation
that the US government exercised effective control over the territory and
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thus was limited by the Constitution in its conduct there (Boumediene,
2008). Furthermore, in attempting to replace the habeas rights of the
Guantanamo inmates with the use of tribunals that did not provide a
reasonable and timely review, Congress exceeded its Constitutional
authority (Boumediene, 2008).
Thus, in review of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, it is readily
apparent that the president enjoys immense power during times of war
and in the conduct of foreign affairs. He or she may terminate an entire
class of judicial proceedings to fulfill an agreement with a foreign nation
(Dames & Moore, 1981), or even blockade ports within the US mainland in
times of grave civil unrest (Prize Cases, 1863). Executive power, however,
faces perhaps its most stringent limitations where it conflicts with due
process guarantees. Although the commander in chief may pursue those
who seek to harm national security, he or she may not entirely dispose of
the Constitution’s most fundamental safeguards on the rights of life,
liberty, and property.

Executive Power as Applied by the Drone Memo
In seeking to resolve the specific dilemma in question, the drone strike
conducted against Anwar al-Aulaqi, the Obama administration leans heavily
on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by
Congress in 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ]). Indeed, the AUMF
authorizes the president to take “all necessary and appropriate force”
against those that he or she identifies as having been involved in the 9/11
attacks (Somin, p.2, 2013). This measure, as acknowledged by all three
branches of the federal government, created a state of war between the
United States and al-Qaeda (Somin, 2013), and imposed no specific
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geographical limits on this new conflict (DOJ). The Obama administration
thus claims that its war-making authority extends to any area in which alQaeda or an associated force has a cohesive ability to plot attacks against
the United States (DOJ). The drone memo also highlights the fact that, as
conceded in Hamdi (2004), one’s citizenship may not exclude a participant
in hostile activities from appropriate government retribution (DOJ).
In light of these particular facts, as well as the voluminous body of
Supreme Court precedent establishing executive dominance in foreign
affairs, one may justifiably conclude that the president should be given
wide latitude in targeting enemy combatants. However, the drone memo
fails to acknowledge many key dilemmas stemming from its use of the
AUMF as a justification for the killing of a U.S. citizen (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
While Curtiss-Wright (1936), Dame & Moore (1981), and The Prize Cases
(1863) all affirmed the authority of the chief executive, each one of these
cases rested in part on the reasonable assumption that Congress approved
of his or her actions. In particular, Dames & Moore cited Youngstown
(1952) in noting that presidential power was subject to immense scrutiny
when employed against the will of Congress (1981).
It is, therefore, singularly important that the AUMF specifically avoids
the word “war” and states explicitly that the authorized use of force is
limited to those that were involved in attacks against the United States on
9/11 (Tribe & Katyal, 2002). AQAP, the affiliate of al-Qaeda to which alAulaqi belonged, did not become a major presence until 2009, a full eight
years after these infamous attacks were conducted (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
Furthermore, in Hamlily v. Obama (2009), the DC District Court stated that
AQAP does not qualify as an “associated force” of al-Qaeda, as it is not
actively and structurally connected to its activities (Fitzpatrick, 2012). If al124
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Aulaqi was not intimately associated with any group that implemented the
September 11th attacks, then the language of the AUMF is too narrow to
sanction his death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, if the executive was correct
in its assertion that the AUMF applied to any terrorist with remote
connections to al-Qaeda, then presidential authority could be stretched to
unusually expansive proportions, potentially even reaching the streets of
major European or American cities (Flaherty, 2015).
Nonetheless, the Department of Justice seeks to claim further
protections for the president in suggesting that his or her actions regarding
the targeting of suspected citizen-terrorists are exempt from judicial review
(DOJ). Citing Baker v. Carr (1962), the drone memo notes that a judicial
decision unfavorable to the administration could seriously curtail the
president’s ability to make decisions involving combat with enemy forces,
and therefore diminish powers that the Constitution designated solely to
the executive branch (DOJ). This idea is certainly not without merit; one
District Court judge explains that members of the federal judiciary are not
qualified to make decisions related to the targeting of enemy forces (alAulaqi v. Obama, 2010).
However, while Baker protects the powers of the legislative and
executive branch from inappropriate judicial interference, it also makes
clear that a branch of government may not escape the Court’s judgement
on the sole grounds that a case involves foreign affairs (1962). Rather,
Supreme Court precedent relating to the global war on terror suggests that
this case may present constitutional due process questions that the
judiciary may not justifiably ignore (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
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Due Process Debate
First, the administration correctly acknowledges in its memo that the
due process rights of US citizens apply abroad, as decided in Reid v. Covert3
(DOJ). It then goes on, however, to argue that they do not necessarily
protect a citizen when he or she engages in the formulation of attacks
against the United States from abroad (DOJ). Using the method of
reasoning found in Hamdi (2004), the drone memo employs the Mathews
(1976) balancing standard, which requires that the government weigh its
own interests and burdens against those of the individual at risk in
determining what constitutes appropriate due process (DOJ). Moreover,
while the Justice Department accepts that no interest is more central to an
individual than his or her life, it claims that the interest of national defense
may prove even more compelling (DOJ).

Therefore, if an individual

sufficiently connected to al-Qaeda and suspected of terrorist activity: (1)
presents an imminent threat to national security (2) cannot be captured,
and (3) a drone strike would follow the laws of war, then both the threat
the individual poses and the difficulties involved in applying due process
would justify the lethal use of force (DOJ).
Viewed through such a lens, the targeting of a U.S. citizen linked to alQaeda may appear to be a reasonable compromise between the rights of
an enemy combatant and the great interests and burdens of his
government. However, the Justice Department misapplies the Mathews
3

The Court in Reid v. Covert (1957) found that the trial of a US civilian

by court-martial in a foreign country was an unconstitutional violation of
her due process rights. Importantly, the plurality decision established that
the United States government is bound by the Constitution in all of its
dealings with citizens abroad (Reid v. Covert, 1957).
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standard to this scenario by failing to fully acknowledge a crucial second
part of this controlling majority opinion (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016). This
part of the ruling states that the government must also consider the risk of
erroneously depriving one of his or her rights, and the value of additional
safeguards that could mitigate such a risk (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016).
The value of measures that could potentially prevent a fatal mistake is
necessarily enormous when one considers the fundamental nature of one’s
right to life and the irreversibility of death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Further, if
detainees in both Hamdi (2004) and Boumediene (2008) were entitled to
some form of due process in challenging their confinement, then it follows
that those facing the possibility of instantaneous death should receive an
equal or greater amount of constitutional protection (Jaffer, 2016).
Particularly the decision in Boumediene (2008), stating that noncitizen
detainees are entitled to some due process protection, should motivate an
even more scrupulous review of action taken against citizens (Fitzpatrick,
2012).
The executive may respond that the application of additional due
process could impose an intolerable burden on the government’s wartime
operations. However, as the Justice Department already conducts
extensive investigations before targeting any individual in a drone strike,
submitting evidence that is the product of such investigations to judicial
review should not add significantly more friction to the procedures already
in place (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, as approximately six months elapsed
between the placement of al-Aulaqi on a kill list and the drafting of the
drone memo in 2010, and the lethal strike did not occur for another full
year (in Sept. 2011), it is doubtful that the threat he posed was too urgent
to allow time for a robust and careful debate (“Anwar al-Awlaki Fast Facts”,
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2017; Jaffer, 2016). It is also worth considering that the decision in
Cleveland (1985) allows for a form of due process that is only procedural,
and that escapes the complications of a full criminal trial (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
This, and the balancing standard in Mathews (1976), provides for the
possibility of an expedited judicial review that would accommodate the
urgency of compelling government interests (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
Finally, the memo proposes that the inter-executive process which
identifies potential suspects before they are cleared for targeting already
constitutes sufficient due process, and renders judicial review unnecessary
(Fitzpatrick, 2012). However, in claiming that it can provide its own due
process, the executive attempts to establish itself as “judge, jury, and
executioner” (Jaffer, p. 55, 2016). In this new role, the president becomes a
court of his own making, independent of the judicial or legislative branch.
This situation is analogous to two cases. First, the Court in Milligan
(1866) held that the use of military commissions, where they are
unauthorized by Congress, and where civil courts are open, is not
constitutionally permissible (Katyal & Tribe, 2002). Second, the Court in
Hamdan stated that a military commission not authorized by Congress or
the Constitution had unconstitutionally tried Hamdan (2006). Even though
the Obama administration never established a formal tribunal to try those
targeted for strikes, it did create a functionally similar process by which the
executive branch alone defines crimes, decides guilt, and determines a
proportionate sentence, all absent Congressional authorization (Jaffer,
2016). Such a system violates not only decisions made in Milligan and
Hamdan, but the fundamental separation of powers as well (Katyal & Tribe,
2002).
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Solutions
Recognition of a problem demands a discussion of plausible
solutions. Many scholars have responded to this obligation and generally
proposed two possibilities. The first is before-the-fact judicial review, in
which the government must submit evidence to a court and gain approval
before placing a US citizen on a kill list (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012).
This type of review could take place in a court newly created by Congress
or incorporated within existing judicial forums, such as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court4 (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012). The
second possibility is after-the-fact judicial review, in which parties could
challenge the justification for a strike after it has occurred, perhaps to seek
damages for an unjust killing (Jaffer, 2017).
To begin with before-the-fact judicial review, Flaherty (2015)
makes clear that this method would only be appropriate if the government
was not under immediate pressure to respond to an imminent threat, per
the consideration of government interests in Mathews (1976). In the case
of individuals like al-Aulaki, however, who are placed on a kill list after
extensive interagency debate and not targeted for an indefinite time
afterwards, the government is in no position to claim such imminence
(Flaherty, 2015). Furthermore, while it is unlikely that the government
4

This court (FISC), established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act, approves requests by the government to surveil and collect data from
potential terrorists and spies (“What is the FISA Court and why is it so
Secretive,” 2017). Some commentators view the FISC as an appropriate
venue for the approval of drone strikes because it is closed to the public
and could accommodate the government’s need for secrecy (Fitzpatrick,
2012).
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could provide the exact form of procedural due process found in Cleveland
(1985), which includes notifying the individual of the charges and providing
them an opportunity to respond, Supreme Court precedent does require
some equivalent procedure (Flaherty, 2015). This should include a courtappointed representative that may receive and respond to notice of a
potential strike on the targeted individual’s behalf (Flaherty, 2015;
Fitzpatrick, 2012).
In before-the-fact review, the executive branch should be required
to demonstrate that the individual in question presents an imminent
threat, that it is necessary to kill them rather than pursue other defensive
measures, and that capture is infeasible (Fitzpatrick, 2012). These are all
conditions that the drone memo concedes must be met before the
government can conduct a targeted killing (DOJ). Additionally, a court
established to review the placement of an individual on a kill list may bar its
proceedings from the public record to protect state secrets, and may
provide expedited hearings to accommodate the government’s need to
respond to threats in a timely fashion (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Thus, the
government would not face undue burdens in applying due process based
on time constraints or the need to protect classified information
(Fitzpatrick, 2012; Matthews, 1976).
In some situations, however, the executive branch may need to
respond to immediate threats that do not allow for any time to seek
before-the-fact judicial review (Flaherty, 2015). The drone memo notes
that domestic police officers are entitled to use lethal force if they are
facing the imminent possibility of serious bodily injury and suggests that
the same principle should apply to drone strikes (Jaffer, 2017; DOJ).
Nonetheless, even police officers responding to a dire threat may be held
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accountable for mistakenly taking a suspect’s life in the context of afterthe-fact judicial review (Jaffer, 2017). Likewise, there must be some judicial
forum in which parties may hold the government accountable for
erroneously targeting an individual in a drone strike (Jaffer, 2017). The
availability, at a minimum, of after-the-fact judicial review would help bind
the government to the rule of law and alleviate concerns regarding the
separation of powers, while also allowing the executive branch to respond
effectively to new threats (Jaffer, 2017).

Conclusion
A lack of transparency within the executive branch, not uncommon
surrounding sensitive foreign policy issues, complicates the present
discussion (Krishnan, 2013). In opting not to disclose evidence concerning
the targeting of enemies abroad, the government makes it difficult for the
public to determine which of its activities are justified and which are not, or
to apply a consistent standard of accountability to the targeting process
(Krishnan, 2013).
The drone memo, in justifying this lack of accountability, contradicts a
principal central to the nation’s founding – that no branch of government
ought to possess arbitrary or unchecked power. The Obama administration
attempted to wield power of exactly that nature by abusing the AUMF to
expand presidential authority beyond recognized limits, failing to
adequately account for due process concerns, and attempting to change
the very nature of due process by placing its full dispensation in the hands
of the executive. To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three
branches of the federal government, judicial review must be made
available to the targets of overwhelming executive power.
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THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE WAR ON RACE: The Relationship between
the Reagan Administration’s Racial Sentiments and The Anti‐Drug Abuse
Act of 1986
Maryum Elnasseh, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, which has
deleterious effects on those incarcerated and takes a toll on American
taxpayers. There are significant racial disparities in these rates, as people of
color constitute over 60% of those incarcerated. In order to contextualize
this problem, sources such as congressional records, President Reagan’s
rhetoric, statements from his adviser, data from the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse, search warrants for narcotics, medical journals
comparing physiological and psychological effects between crack and
powder cocaine, and media coverage of the “crack epidemic” were
examined. These sources showed that, because of Congress’s failure to
fact‐check the media hysteria regarding crack, law enforcement’s targeting
of Blacks at higher rates than Whites, and the subtly racist political
sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency, it seems plausible that
the 1986 Anti‐Drug Abuse Act was intentionally passed to target racial
minorities.
Introduction
On October 27th, 1986, amid media frenzy over the “crack
epidemic,” President Ronald Reagan signed the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of
1986 into effect (Vagins 2). Only four months earlier, in June of that year,
Americans had seen the deaths of two young Black professional athletes—
Len Bias and Don Rogers—due to crack and cocaine overdoses, leading
media coverage of crack cocaine to skyrocket to its peak (Reinarman and
Levine, Crack in America 48). This heightened media coverage resulted in a
flood of widespread myths about crack cocaine, namely that it was
“instantly addictive,” caused violent behavior, and resulted in mothers
giving birth to “crack babies” (Reinarman and Levine, Crack in the Rearview
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Mirror 184‐191). Although this was not the first time that the United States
had seen exaggerated media coverage of crack or cocaine—a New York
Times article dating back to 1914 claimed that cocaine made Black people
“resistant” to gun bullets—the media hysteria of the 1960s was so
widespread that congressional records from 1986 show Congresspeople
quoting newspaper articles to cite information regarding the crack
epidemic (E. Williams; Cong. Rec. 21 Mar. 1986 E 944).
As a part of the “War on Drugs,” the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act
established new mandatory minimum sentences for possession of various
drugs, including heroin, cocaine, freebase or crack cocaine, PCP, and
marijuana. Additionally, the Act created a 100:1 ratio of disparity between
crack cocaine and powder cocaine—a person sentenced for possessing a
specific amount of crack cocaine receives an equivalent sentence to
someone possessing one hundred times more powder cocaine (Nunn 396).
The disparity proves to be problematic as various studies, such as the 1996
study published by the Journal of American Medical Association, have
shown that there are no major physiological or psychological differences in
the effects of powder cocaine versus crack cocaine (Vagins 4).
At the time of the act’s introduction and subsequent passage,
Reagan had just begun his second presidential term, following his 1984
campaign, in which he had declared “the South shall rise again,” a
Confederate slogan. In office, Reagan condemned busing for school
integration, opposed affirmative action, and threatened to veto a proposed
extension of the Voting Rights Act, all of which exemplify the racial
polarization that characterized his presidency (J. Williams). Furthermore,
Reagan’s use of phrases such as “Chicago welfare queens” and “strapping
young buck” have been characterized as “dog whistle politics”—coded
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racial appeals—that evoke stereotypical images of “a lazy, larcenous Black
woman ripping off society’s generosity without remorse” and a
“threatening, physically powerful Black man who defies White authority
and who lusts for White women” (Haney‐Lopez).
In the four decades since the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act,
the United States has seen a 500% increase in its prison population; in fact,
although the United States holds less than 5% of the world’s population, it
currently makes up almost 25% of the world’s prison population (Brown).
Although crime rates are actually decreasing, the US continues to lock up
more people than any other nation (Gramlich). This mass incarceration has
been felt the strongest by the Black community, as data shows that not
only are its members more likely to use crack cocaine, while White
Americans are more likely to use powder cocaine, but also that law
enforcement has targeted Black Americans at a higher rate than Whites
(Benner 109).
Due to its creation of a 100:1 ratio disparity between crack cocaine
and powder cocaine, the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986 led to mass
incarceration that intentionally and disproportionately affected Black
Americans. Because of Congress’s failure to fact‐check the media hysteria
regarding crack cocaine, law enforcement officials’ targeting of Black
Americans at higher rates than Whites, and the, at times, subtly racist
political sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency, it seems
plausible that the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was passed with the
intention to target racial minorities.
Comparing Physiological Difference between Powder and Crack Cocaine
Although studies have shown very minimal differences between
the effects of powder cocaine and crack cocaine, the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act
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of 1986 created a 100:1 ratio difference between sentencing for the two; a
person sentenced for possessing five grams of crack cocaine receives a five‐
year sentence, while someone possessing 500 grams of powder cocaine
receives that equivalent sentence (Chambers 150; Nunn 396). However,
according to a study published by the Journal of the American Medical
Association in 1996, cocaine’s physiological and psychological effects are
similar regardless of whether it is in its powder or crack form. While crack is
prepared by dissolving and treating powder cocaine with an alkali such as
baking soda, the fact remains that both are constituted of the same drug
(Vagins 4‐5). Furthermore, writer Kristin Zimmerman asserts that prior to
the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986, powder cocaine and crack
were “indistinguishable” (4).
At the time of the Act’s passage, there was a popular belief that
crack was so much more addictive than powder cocaine that it was actually
“instantly addicting” (Vagins 5). This belief that crack is a different drug
than cocaine is not true, as crack was simply a new form of the old
substance—its main difference being that it is smoked, rather than snorted
like its powder form (Reinarman and Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror
184). Although cocaine enters the bloodstream quicker when smoked and
thus “yields a more intense rush” than snorting it, crack is not more
harmful than powder cocaine, as it has the same effects on users,
according to data provided by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (184). In
fact, even the negative effects of prenatal crack exposure were identical to
those of prenatal powder cocaine exposure (U.S. Sentencing Commission E‐
1‐E‐6). Furthermore, according to a written statement by Glen R. Hanson,
the Acting Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission in 2002, cocaine yields the same physiological and
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psychotropic effects once it reaches the brain, regardless of its form (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 17).
Socioeconomic Differences in Users of Powder Cocaine versus Users of
Crack Cocaine
Despite there being no significant difference between powder
cocaine and crack in terms of their physiological effects, there is a major
difference between the users of the two, as crack cocaine is significantly
cheaper and more accessible to low‐income users (Reinarman and Levine,
Crack in the Rearview Mirror 184). In the mid‐1980s, powder cocaine was
usually sold for one hundred dollars per gram while crack was sold in small
rocks for five to ten dollars. Thus, while powder cocaine was used most
often among affluent people, crack was sold to a “whole new class of
people on inner‐city street corners” (184). Furthermore, crack use did not
expand outside “impoverished inner‐city neighborhoods” due to its intense
high, which is quickly followed by a painful low (187). Since this often leads
to binging, which many people cannot regularly participate in without
“disrupting their lives,” it is predominantly those “at the margins of
society…people without education, jobs, or life chances, people in pain and
despair” who are more likely to use crack (188). Eventually, more people
began to recognize this, as The New York Times reported in October 1989
that crack is mainly limited to “poor urban neighborhoods” (188).
Additionally, according to law professor Kenneth Nunn, Black
Americans are more likely to use crack, while White drug users are more
likely to use powder cocaine. Based on data collected by the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, while over 18.5 million
White Americans have tried powder cocaine at some time, only 2.8 million
of that group have ever tried crack cocaine (Nunn 397; Benner 115‐116).
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Likewise, the data shows that Black Americans use crack cocaine at a higher
rate than Whites; although 214,000 Black Americans had used crack
cocaine within one month, only 147,000 White Americans had used it
during that same time period (Benner 115‐116). Over 1.1 million Whites,
however, had used powder cocaine within that month (Benner 115‐116).
Additionally, according to nationwide statistics obtained by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Black Americans are more likely to be convicted of
offenses relating to crack cocaine, while Whites are more likely to be
convicted of offenses relating to powder cocaine (Vagins i; Graham 781).
Overall, 80 to 90% of Americans convicted of crack cocaine offenses are
Black, while 70% of those convicted of powder cocaine offenses are
Caucasian or Latino (Zimmerman 164).
Thus, since there appears to be no major differences in
physiological or psychological effects between the two forms of cocaine, it
is surprising that there is such a severe difference in sentencing between
the two. Once noted that crack cocaine was available to a significantly
different user base than powder cocaine, a possibility arises that the
harsher sentencing for crack cocaine could have been passed to specifically
discriminate against its lower‐income user base consisting predominantly
of Black Americans. It is also worth noting that the socioeconomic
difference in user bases between the two forms of cocaine was known to
the 99th Congress that created the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986. According
to records from a 1986 Senate hearing, Charles R. Schuster, former director
of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, testifies that crack “sells for a
lower unit price,” thus attracting “less affluent street customers” than
powder cocaine (Graham 773). Additionally, Senator Leahy from Vermont,
in a Congressional record from 1986, exclaims that “one hit [of crack
139

The War on Drugs and the War on Race

cocaine] costs just ten dollars” (Graham 773). Likewise, in another
Congressional discussion, representative Charles Rangel of New York stated
that crack can sell “for as little as five dollars” (Chambers 164).
Mass Incarceration as a Result of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986
Over the past four decades—which is approximately the amount of
time that has passed since the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of
1986—the United States has seen a 500% increase in its number of inmates
(Brown and Patterson). Therefore, it is plausible that these skyrocketing
incarceration rates resulted from the “War on Drugs,” which brought about
mandatory minimum drug sentences, life sentences without the possibility
of parole, and the three‐strikes law. For example, in the state of New York,
almost 30,000 people are indicted for drug felonies each year and 10,000
are sent to prison (Fellner). In fact, being convicted of a single sale of two
ounces of cocaine can lead to a mandatory prison sentence of 15 years to
life, which is equivalent to the prison term for murder (Fellner). From 1986
through 2000, incarcerations rates rose every year, not only tripling the
prison population but also giving the United States the highest
incarceration rate of any modern democracy (Reinarman and Levine, Crack
in the Rearview Mirror 182). While at the beginning of the Reagan
administration, the number of drug offenders was about 50,000, by the
beginning of Bush’s second administration, that number had increased to
about 400,000; it is important to note that that this population was
disproportionally comprised of people of color who had not committed
violent crimes (183).
According to Jamie Fellner, who is the Senior Adviser of the U.S.
Program of Human Rights Watch, “drug felonies are the single most
significant factor underlying the remarkable growth of the prison
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populations.” In fact, Fellner claims that New York’s laws “almost
guarantee” disproportionate sentences for minor and low‐level offenders.
For example, an adult convicted of possession of only four ounces of
cocaine or selling only two ounces must receive a minimum sentence of 15
years—the maximum is life. Furthermore, for a sale of ten dollars’ worth of
cocaine, the court must impose a minimum term of one to three years, but
is allowed to sentence higher terms up to 25 years (Fellner). If this ten‐
dollar sale of cocaine is a second felony, then the lowest sentence that the
court could impose is four‐and‐a‐half to nine years long (Fellner). Not only
are these possessions or sales of “small amounts of controlled substances”
classified as felonies equivalent to murder or rape, but are actually “subject
to the same sentences” (Fellner). Fellner argues that there is no way to
justify how an “adult selling a couple of ounces of cocaine to other adults
has engaged in conduct as harmful or reprehensible, for sentencing
purposes, as taking the life or violating the physical integrity of another.”
Even more alarming than this mass incarceration is the severe
racial disparity in incarceration rates. Of the aforementioned 30,000 people
in New York who are indicted for drug felonies each year, approximately
90% are either Black or Hispanic (Fellner). While some may argue that this
is due to a higher use of drugs by Black Americans, various data
compilations and studies have proven otherwise. In fact, according to data
compiled in 2003 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Whites comprise of
7.8% of crack cocaine defendants, while Black Americans made up more
than 80%. However, according to the 2004 National Survey on Drug Use
and Health, over 66% of crack cocaine users are White or Hispanic (Vagins
1). It is also worth noting that this information has been known for some
time—in his dissenting opinion in the 1996 case U.S. v. Armstrong, Justice
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Stevens notes that despite Whites representing 65% of crack cocaine users,
they make up only 4% of the federal defendants charged with trafficking in
crack. Alternatively, the percentage of Black crack distribution defendants
averaged 84.8% between the years of 1996 and 2000 (Nunn 397).
In fact, this disproportion is so significant that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission notes in its 1997 Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and
Federal Sentencing Policy that “sentences appear to be harsher and more
severe for racial minorities as a result of this law” (Nunn 397).
Furthermore, in 1986, prior to the establishment of federal mandatory
minimums for crack cocaine offenses, the average drug sentence for Black
Americans across the nation was 11% higher than that for Whites;
however, only four years later—after the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse
Act of 1986—that average was 49% higher for Black Americans (Drug Policy
Alliance). According to Brown and Patterson, 1 million of the 2.3 million
people incarcerated in the United States are Black. While one in three Black
men will experience prison, “White men’s risk is just 6%” (Brown and
Patterson). Overall, this incarceration has detrimental effects on
communities and can even impact political power. For example, in 34
states, those who are on parole or probation do not have the right to vote.
Despite the severe impacts of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
supporters argue that such severity is necessary, not because it is the fair
and moral consequence to a wrongdoing, but rather because it serves as a
deterrent for future drug offenses. However, this becomes a problematic
argument when it fails to take into account the principle of proportionality,
which dictates that the severity of a punishment must be fitted to the
actions and consequences of the crime. Further, since the average minor
drug offender causes minimal harm, it is unjust to penalize the
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aforementioned individuals so severely (Fellner). Arguing that “the goal of
deterrence cannot override the imperative of proportionality between
offending conduct and punishment,” Fellner states that, without the
principle of proportionality, “egregiously punitive sanctions could be placed
on trivial offenses, such as overtime parking, and justified as effective
deterrents.” Therefore, criminal punishments must be reasonable to the
weight of the actual crime committed. Similarly, Paul Larkin, writing in the
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, states that “the racial tensions
and distrust generated by refusing to reduce further or eliminate the racial
disparities generated by that law might not be worth whatever deterrent
effect its severe penalties might have” (291).
In further response to the argument of deterrence, anti‐drug laws
have not actually shrunk the crack trade, as Larkin argues that new dealers
are always willing to take the place of anyone arrested for selling crack
“because the remote prospect of future long‐term imprisonment is not a
deterrent to someone with no other option” (248). In fact, due to the high
unemployment and poverty in the inner cities, this mass incarceration
ended up actually increasing the number of youth involved in the illegal
drug economy (Reinarman and Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror 183).
Despite imprisonment, hard‐core drug abuse and overdose deaths are not
decreasing (183).
If harsh sentences for crack cocaine offenses have little deterrent
impact and contribute to the United States’ alarming level of mass
incarceration, why have they been tolerated by mainstream politicians for
so long? One of the possible reasons why such severe and inhumane drug
sentencing laws have been accepted is because they predominantly impact
Black Americans and other racial minorities (Fellner). For example, in New
143

The War on Drugs and the War on Race

York, people of color represent over 85% of those indicted for drug felonies
and 94% of drug felons sent to prison, while Whites make up just 5.3% of
New York’s total drug felon population (Fellner). According to Fellner, the
“predominantly White state legislature” has not been sensitive to the
needs “of people from communities different from their own.” Despite
declaring their concern for the damage drugs cause in communities, “public
officials have ignored the hardship to individuals and their families from
unnecessary years of imprisonment” (Fellner). Additionally, this raises the
question of whether these “deterrent” laws would still be supported if they
were, instead, predominantly impacting White Americans.

Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement Targeting
Discrediting the idea that higher drug usage rates by Black
Americans leads to the racial disparity in sentencing, researchers have
illustrated that law enforcement actually targets Black Americans at a
higher frequency than Whites, augmenting the chances of incarceration for
that subgroup of the population. Law professor Laurence Benner asserts
that members of the Black community in San Diego were vastly
overrepresented as targets of narcotics search warrants, while Whites were
significantly underrepresented; although 69‐78% of the population in some
judicial districts was comprised of White people, 81% of search warrants
were issued to people of color (109). Even though Whites made up
approximately 55% of San Diego’s population at the time, “less than one in
five narcotics warrants targeted a White resident” (Benner 111). Blacks, on
the other hand, made up just 9% of the population, yet were targeted in
almost one‐third of the warrants (111). Furthermore, of all the warrants for
cocaine, 88% were for crack cocaine, rather than powder cocaine. Of all
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narcotics, crack cocaine was searched for the most frequently, accounting
for 39% of all narcotic searches in San Diego, while powder cocaine
accounted for only 6% of search warrants (105‐106). This is interesting
because, as previously noted, although over 18.5 million Whites have tried
cocaine at some point, only 2.8 million had tried crack cocaine. This record
of search warrants in San Diego exemplifies law enforcements’ disportional
targeting of Black Americans for drug searches, despite Whites comprising
a larger percentage of the population.
Clearly, this is not due to a lack of drug use by White Americans, as
the federal government's 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
found that 72% of all drug users were White—only 15% were Black. In that
same year, there were almost three times as many White cocaine users
than Black cocaine users. In fact, of the searches that were issued for White
targets, 53% were successful; however, only 28% of the warrants targeting
Black people were successful (Benner 120‐121). Since “drug use is not
exclusive to any racial group, it might be expected that the race of search
warrant targets would mirror the proportion each racial group represents
in the population,” yet this “did not turn out to be the case” (110).
According to Benner, “drug users purchase drugs from members of their
own race,” and “the overwhelming majority of drug sellers are White,”
which thus implies that “Blacks and Hispanics do not have a monopoly on
either drug use or drug distribution activities” (112‐113).
In his examination of the San Diego Judicial District, Benner finds
that “less than 3% of all narcotics warrants targeted a predominantly White
suburban area” (109). In examining three suburban zip codes where Blacks
comprised less than 2% of the population, Benner finds that “in two of
these zip codes, there were no warrants issued at all,” and in the third, “all
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but one of the warrants were for methamphetamine” (109). It is worth
noting that this would, of course, be fair if the drugs were indeed being
found in the predominantly Black, inner city of San Diego; however,
“despite the frequency with which the inner‐city zip code areas were
searched, the majority of the search warrants issued in this predominantly
non‐White area failed to recover the drug police were seeking”—in fact, in
one inner city zip code area, three‐fourths of the search warrants “failed to
recover the drug sought” (109). On the other hand, “although the number
of warrants in the predominantly White suburban area was too small to
make a statistical comparison, it was observed that two‐thirds of these
warrants were successful” — all of which were for methamphetamine
(109). This illustrates law enforcements’ disportionate targeting of Black
neighborhood for drug searches, despite search warrants being more
successful in White neighborhoods.
Additionally, criminal justice system expert and lawyer Paul Larkin
cites that while law enforcement officials have meticulously enforced laws
against Black crack dealers in “predominantly urban Black communities,”
they have neglected to pursue equally intensive enforcement on
distribution and use of powder cocaine in predominantly White, suburban
areas (247). Across the nation, crack cocaine offenders — who are mainly
Black — have “consistently” received significantly longer sentences than
those — generally White Americans — serving for powder cocaine
offenses, thus “[producing] a prison population with an exponentially larger
number of Black than White cocaine trafficking convicts” (Larkin 247). In
conclusion, “these aggressive law enforcement efforts take advantage of
poor, urban Blacks marginalized by society, deny [them] the economic
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opportunities available to suburban Whites, and shunt [them] off into
America’s urban ghettos” (247).
Political Context of the Passage of the Act
In the months leading up to the passage of the Anti‐Drug Act of
1986, the United States saw a wave of media hysteria, resulting in various,
exaggerated myths about crack, namely that it made individuals more
prone to violent behavior, was instantly addicting, produced “crack babies”
when used during pregnancy, and was quickly spreading into all sectors of
society. Contrary to media claims, however, “evidence that crack was
neither instantly nor inevitably addicting was available in every government
survey on drug use that asked about crack from 1987 on” (Reinarman and
Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror 186). Additionally, even in its peak
years, crack was only ever widespread within the urban underclass,
according to statistics from 1974‐1991 survey data (Chambers 149).
Contrary to claims in various media sources, such as in Time’s
September 1986 issue, that crack was “killing a whole generation of
children” data from a National Institute on Drug Abuse survey measuring
the prevalence of drug use among young people found that “less than 5%
of 18 to 29‐year‐olds in the U.S. have ever tried it, let alone gone on to use
it regularly, abuse it, get addicted to it, or die from it” (Reinarman and
Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror 186). Data from this same survey also
found “exceptionally high rates of discontinuation — that is, of those who
have ever tried crack, 80% have not used it in the past year, and over 90%
have not used it in the past month” (186). Furthermore, according to 1991
data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, only 0.4% of
respondents between the ages of 12‐17 had reported using cocaine in the
last month, while 2% of those aged 18‐34 had, and only 0.5% of those over
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the age of 35 (Chambers 149). In that same year, only 3% of high school
seniors reported having ever tried crack, and from 1974 to 1990, “the
percentage of 18‐25‐year‐olds who had used cocaine in the last 30 days
never exceeded 10%” (149). Additionally, media and politicians
exaggerated stories about crack babies without scientific reasoning.
However, once studies that had larger samples and controlled for
confounding variables emerged, “support for the major claims of fetal
‘damage’ either declined or disappeared” (Reinarman and Levine, Crack in
the Rearview Mirror 192).
Other examples of exaggerated claims about crack can even be
found in the rhetoric used by members of the 99th Congress, which
ultimately passed the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986. For example, media
and politicians often used the term “epidemic” when referring to crack,
thus referring to it as “a sickness from which the United States needed to
be protected” (Chambers 160). These exaggerated claims can also be seen
in Congressional records of former New York Representative Robert Garcia,
who not only states that cocaine had “increased 500% in the last year” but
that crack “probably poses the greatest drug threat to users and society to
date, because it is extremely addictive, with addiction taking hold even
after a single use” (162). Additionally, crack was referred to as a “plague”
and a “scourge,” especially by Senator Byrd of West Virginia, who “then
commented on the number of deaths due to crack use” (162).
During Congressional hearings regarding the “crisis of the crack
epidemic,” Congress asserted that not only was crack more addictive than
powder cocaine, but that it produced different, more dangerous
physiological effects (Zimmerman 163). Members of Congress also believed
that since crack attracted users who could not afford powder cocaine, it
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therefore led to a higher rate of crime and thus should be punished more
severely (163). However, this suggests that the politicians oftentimes did
not fact‐check the claims they were citing in congressional discussions. For
example, when voicing his concerns over young people experimenting with
cocaine or crack, Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana prepared a
statement to be inserted in the Congressional Record, claiming that “a
1985 survey showed almost two‐thirds of high school seniors had used
illicit drugs” (Chambers 171). However, Hamilton had been discussing
cocaine when referencing the 1985 survey, thus implying that two‐thirds of
school students had used cocaine (171). This proved to be misleading, as
the survey simply referred to “illicit drugs,” which may or may not have
included cocaine (171). Chambers further notes that while 1986 surveys
indicated that although “only 12.7% of high school seniors had used
cocaine in the last year and only slightly more than 4% had used crack
cocaine, Mr. Hamilton’s” – as well as other politicians’ – “use of illegal drug
use surveys indicating that 61% or more of seniors had used drugs was
extremely misleading and made it seem that cocaine and crack use among
children was more prevalent than it was” (171‐172).
According to Chambers, “given the volume of newspaper and
magazine articles whether read or referred to in Congress and submitted to
the Record, it is highly likely that for many of the Congressmen the media
was their source of information” (177). In fact, this was even confirmed by
Senator Paula Hawkins of Florida:
The media, local and national, from one end of the country to the
other have been doing their job. They have been educating the
public to the scope and nature of the threat. Two of the major
networks, CBS and NBC, have aired documentaries on cocaine. The
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news magazines – Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report
– have run cover stories on cocaine, and its chemical cousin, crack.
Since some of these statements by politicians were made as little as two
months before the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act was passed, it seems Congress
failed to double‐check the legitimacy of media allegations before using
them for the basis of such an impactful act (Chambers 177‐178).
Another important factor that may have played a role in the
passage of the act was the death of professional athletes Len Bias and Don
Rogers only four months prior to the Act’s passage. Due to media hysteria
at the time, “Len Bias and Don Rogers became the faces of cocaine, an
example of the tragedy that ensues when drugs, specifically cocaine and
crack, are abused,” with Bias’s name being mentioned in at least 34
Congressional discussions (Chambers 187). Despite not being the only two
people to ever die from crack or cocaine, Bias and Rogers were flooding the
news and thus became the predominant names and faces associated with
cocaine‐related death (188). Additionally, since both men were Black, and
their images were constantly on the news, it is likely that Congressmen
would then associate cocaine and crack use with Blacks thus leading to “the
face of cocaine and crack” being Black Americans (188).
Around the time of the passage of the Anti‐Drug Act of 1986, both
the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act had turned 20 years old, and
Black people were gaining more political power in the United States. For
legislators who either felt threatened by the increasing power for Black
people or personally benefited from racial discrimination, an easy way to
hinder the expansion of opportunity for Black people in the nation would
be to pass an act that has the ability to bring about detrimental social,
political, and economic effects on the Black community. In many cases,
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drug offenses can be considered felonies and therefore, those who are
convicted of such acts could be deprived of their right to suffrage. For
example, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, over 200,000
Black men in Florida — 31% of all Black men in the state — were barred
from voting during the 2000 Presidential Election because nonviolent drug
possession is counted as a felony. Thus, for those politicians who were
displeased by the fact that Blacks had recently gained more political power
and could now influence presidential elections, passing the Anti‐Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 was likely a solid solution. This claim is further supported
when noting that Reagan was still able to win the election despite over 90%
of Black voters voting against him.
The Role of Ronald Reagan
According to award‐winning scholar and law professor Ian Haney‐
Lopez, racism was enrooted in the Reagan presidency. In a 1981 interview,
Reagan’s adviser Lee Atwater states that the key strategy to attracting
White southern voters is by advocating for policies in which “Blacks get
hurt worse than Whites.” As early as 1966, during his gubernatorial
campaign in California, Reagan utilized dog whistle politics when he
severely criticized welfare, opposed government efforts to promote
neighborhood integration, and supported a state ballot initiative to allow
racial discrimination in the housing market (Haney‐Lopez). Furthermore,
Reagan’s race‐baiting continued even when he moved to national politics,
launching his campaign just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, a town that
was still famous for the lynching of civil rights volunteers by the Ku Klux
Klan 16 years earlier (Haney‐Lopez). Allegedly, this location was suggested
by a local official, who had assured the Republican National Committee
that this was the best location to win “George Wallace inclined voters,” and
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when Reagan returned to Philadelphia, Mississippi in 1984, he used the
neo‐Confederate slogan “the South shall rise again” (Haney‐Lopez).
Furthermore, according to Chambers, in response to White
backlash following the 1978 California v. Bakke Supreme Court decision,
the Reagan administration “not only ceased enforcing all affirmative action
regulations, but also argued against them in court” (151). Further implying
that Reagan was racist, Chambers cites that not only did Reagan only meet
once, briefly, with the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and “refuse to
meet with them for the remainder of his two terms,” it was also “during
Reagan’s administration that the CBC’s funding was challenged, resulting in
the loss of their offices on Capitol Hill and some of their power” (152).
Haney‐Lopez argues that Reagan proclaimed his racial appeals
through criticism of welfare, when he repeatedly told the story of a
“Chicago welfare queen” whom he describes by cultivating the
“stereotypical image of a lazy, larcenous Black woman ripping off society’s
generosity without remorse.” Similarly, Chambers reasons that by
propagating the myth of lazy Black women who live off welfare by often
referring to them as “welfare queens,” it was easier for Reagan to cut the
social services budget (151). Through this, Reagan also implied another
stereotype, in which Whites are “the workers, the taxpayers, the persons
playing by the rules and struggling to make ends meet while brazen
minorities partied with their hard‐earned tax dollars” (Haney‐Lopez). By
using phrases such as “strapping young buck” – which has been long used
to evoke the “threatening image of a physically powerful Black man who
defies White authority and who lusts for White women” – to describe
welfare users, Reagan evoked stereotypes through his rhetoric.
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According to Haney‐Lopez, Reagan’s racially coded rhetoric and
strategy proved effective among voters, as 34% of “Democrats who
believed civil rights leaders were pushing too fast” defected from the party
to vote for Reagan. Furthermore, 71% of those who felt “the government
should not make any special effort to help [Blacks] because they should
help themselves,” voted for Reagan (Haney‐Lopez). Although some may
argue that this is because the United States is “historically and at heart” a
conservative nation, according to statistics from 2009 survey data on
American attitudes towards activist government, the majority of Americans
believe it is the government’s role to lend a helping hand to its people,
therefore making it a fundamentally liberal country (Haney‐Lopez). Thus,
Haney‐Lopez suggests, it is the strength of racism, rather than the strength
of conservatism, that allows dog whistlers to gain their victories.
Additionally,

Haney‐Lopez

argues

that

hostility

toward

government, oftentimes, is rooted in “racial narratives of freedom in
jeopardy,” citing how Reagan’s appointee to the head of the Justice
Department, William Reynolds, who began highly publicized campaigns
opposing affirmative action, argued that “race‐conscious remedies
amounted to impermissible racism against Whites, intervened in school
desegregation by encouraging schools challenge court‐ordered integration,
and defended school segregation.” According to Haney‐Lopez, Reagan’s
campaign against affirmative action was yet another form of dog whistle
politics, as by attacking affirmative action, the GOP was further able to
defend White interests.
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Conclusion
Due to Reagan’s era of tax and budget cuts, Black Americans
suffered more disproportionate income losses than any other population in
the country (“Falling Behind” 150‐151, 162). According to author and
political science professor Clarence Lusane, the drug trade “provided the
only glimmer of economic hope” after Black communities were left with a
lack of economic and social resources (49). Since anyone who is willing to
expose his or herself to subsequent risks can participate in the business,
the drug trade is considered by some to be “the most equal opportunity
employer in the world” (87). Therefore, the drug trade can be considered a
threat to White supremacy, as no other job trades can offer such a
“barrier‐free opportunity” for Black Americans (Nunn 422).
Furthermore, some scholars argue that drug‐taking may be
valuable to marginalized groups, as it symbolizes their “defiance of
perceived social injustices” (Young 46). According to Nunn, this means drug
use by people of color is an act of rebellion “against the authority of the
White power structure” and therefore threatens “White social control”
(418). Thus, it can be seen that by passing such severe anti‐drug laws, not
only did the Reagan administration bring about the mass incarceration of a
large number of Black people, it also prevented potential defiance of the
White power structure. Since cocaine use was associated with Black people
and portrayed as something that made them “stronger,” it was an even
further threat to White power and thus had to be immediately stopped.
Furthermore, logically, it made more sense for lawmakers and law
enforcement to focus on cocaine. Since crack is a derivative of cocaine, if
“cocaine was the focus and had the harsher penalties, by stopping or
decreasing the amount of cocaine, crack would also be decreased”
(Chambers 203‐20). The fact that this was not the case, however, is
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questionable, especially when paired with previous knowledge that cocaine
was more often used by upper‐class, White Americans. Likewise, according
to Reinarman and Levine:
But this claim [that crack was a new, deeply dangerous
drug] was not based so much on the increased intensity of
this mode of cocaine ingestion as on its new market niche
among the “dangerous class” of impoverished Black and
brown people. If the crack scare really had been about a
new and extreme high, then freebasing and injecting
cocaine would have been made subject to similarly
extreme punishments long before anyone had ever heard
of crack. (Crack in the Rearview Mirror 185)
Additionally, the racist overtone that appeared in media allegations
– such as in the claim that cocaine use would cause Black men to rape
women – is similar to the dog‐whistle politics of the Reagan administration,
in which the rhetoric used by Reagan propagated negative stereotypes of
Black Americans and “provoked a sense of White victimization” (Haney‐
Lopez). In both cases, there are instances of those with significant political
power – whether Congresspeople or President Reagan, for example – using
racist rhetoric to promote political agendas.
Overall, the mid‐1980s saw an unprecedented period of mass
hysteria regarding the “crack epidemic,” in which politicians did not fact‐
check the media’s exaggerations and myths. Since the planners and
strategists behind the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986 most likely already
knew this law would predominantly impact lower‐income, Black Americans,
there was a lack of thorough planning or sympathy for the people whom
this law would affect. Given Reagan’s history of racist rhetoric and support
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for racist policies, and the Act’s political, social, and economic impacts on
Black communities, it is likely that the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was
passed intentionally to target Black communities and thus advance
Reagan’s political agenda.
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